

End State: Relevant in Stability Operations?
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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: End state: Relevant in Stability Operations?

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Abstract

SAMS MONOGRAPH by Major Michael T. Morrissey, U.S. Army, 68 pages.

As the war on terrorism progresses, it appears stability operations may continue to be the logical follow-on phase after intervention into each failed state. There is a necessity for military forces in the post-conflict environment to keep the peace while the failed state rebuilds. Already, there are approximately 71,000 U.S. military personnel committed to such operations around the world. Interventions in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Macedonia are recent examples of America's commitment to end violence, end suffering, and provide humanitarian support. American military forces have been involved with operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina for over six years. Operations in Kosovo indicate a similar path with no end in sight.

A review of western military literature indicates a plethora of information on end state as it relates to war. Despite an extensive history in stability operations, there is a void on the role of end state. The purpose of this monograph is to determine if end state is a relevant construct for the campaign planning of stability operations, specifically, peace operations.

As globalization spreads, international pressure and economic necessity have resulted in U.S. intervention numerous times in the past decade. While a bipolar world afforded a sense of certainty, the known threat of communism, the multipolar environment is characterized by uncertainty and complexity. As the United States continues to become engaged in peace operations, it is imperative to understand the implementation of end states. Peace operations cannot become unending commitments and tie up precious resources. Piecemeal commitment of American military forces around the globe affects readiness.

From the theoretical perspective, the author examines goal setting, problem solving, and the role of intent. From the historical perspective, two case studies, Bosnia and Kosovo, are evaluated to assess the role of end state in planning.

The monograph includes recommendations to improve both Army and joint doctrine in order to minimize confusion over the development of an end state. Recommendations are in the areas of strategy, doctrine, operational planning, civil-military relationship, and force planning and readiness.

The author concludes that planning without a start point, a goal or end state, is flawed. When developing campaign plans, operational commanders cannot lose sight of the importance of an end state. However, the military alone cannot achieve an end state in peace operations. Success requires a campaign plan that integrates all instruments of national power. Only then is the term end state a relevant construct.

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CHAPTER ONE

“We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world and the peace can only be maintained by the strong.”

General George C. Marshall

INTRODUCTION

With the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. involvement in peace operations may appear trivial. The war on terrorism and American homeland security has rightfully taken front stage. U.S. peace interventions are still very relevant however, and the debate over their duration and purpose in national strategy must continue. As the Allied campaign in Afghanistan proceeds as planned, the deployment of an international peacekeeping force signals the transition to stability operations. The interim post-Taliban government requested a military contingent to keep the peace while they build the country’s infrastructure. Initially led by Britain, the “International Security Assistance Force” works alongside the Afghan police force.¹

As the war on terrorism progresses, it appears stability operations may continue to be the logical follow-on phase after each intervention into a failed state. There is a necessity for military forces in the post-conflict environment to keep the peace while the failed state rebuilds, “providing a shield behind which the state-building process can commence and progress.”²

Already, there are approximately 71,000 U.S. military personnel committed to such operations

¹ “Deal for international peacekeepers in Kabul signed,” [database online] (accessed January 11, 2002); available from www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/01/04/ret.kabul.security/index January 4, 2002. The force will number approximately 4,500-5000 and be composed of British, French, German, and Dutch troops. Although the United States is not planning to participate in this force, it is providing logistical and financial support. Related article, “Biden urges funds, strong peacekeeping force in Afghanistan”, [database online] (January 12, 2002, accessed January 13, 2002); available from www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/01/04/biden.afghanistan/index.

² Donald M. Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 118. The author presents an accurate model of internal war on page 120. In that model, the crisis forms, NGOs arrive, crisis worsens, crisis explodes, outsiders intervene, outsiders face

around the world.³ These interventions have a rightful place in U.S. foreign policy. However, they cannot be implemented without a clear idea of what defines their success and how they may impact military readiness.

Interventions in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Macedonia are recent examples of America's commitment to end violence, end suffering, and provide humanitarian support. American military forces have been involved with operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina for over six years. Operations in Kosovo indicate a similar path with no end in sight. Referred to as Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in joint doctrine and stability operations in U.S. Army doctrine, they are known to be politically sensitive and restrictive in nature. They focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities.⁴ These operations are especially challenging for three reasons: political goals are not always clear; difficulty gaining international consensus to support intervention; and technology enables world problems and tactical mistakes to be broadcast immediately into homes around the globe.

A review of western military literature indicates a plethora of information on end state as it relates to war. Despite an extensive history in OOTW, there is a void on the role of end state. The purpose of this monograph is to determine if end state is a relevant construct for the campaign planning of peace operations. Before exploring this question, it is important to further

dilemma, outsider is frustrated, outsider becomes disillusioned, outsider withdraws, and crisis returns. Without a well-thought out campaign plan, this cycle will continue.

³ Congressional Budget Office (CBO) based on Nina M. Serafino, Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and "Lessons Learned" for Kosovo, CRS Report for Congress RL301184. (Congressional Research Services, 20 May 1999.) Breakdown by operation: Iraq-Kuwait-35,000, Haiti-21,000, Bosnia-26,000 (includes personnel outside Bosnia providing support.), Kosovo-7,100, East Timor-1,300, and the Sinai-1,200. The numbers fluctuate based on unit rotation and ongoing operational changes. However, they give an idea of the level of impact peace operations have on U.S. force strength. Also, other operations such as counter drugs are not included. Finally, this number does not include U.S. personnel currently deployed in Operation Enduring Freedom, America's fight against terrorism.

⁴ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3.07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. (Washington: Office of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1995), 1-1.

define OOTW, review the background of U.S. involvement in these type operations, define the strategic environment, and finally, establish the relevance of the topic.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) DEFINED

Whether referred to as Operations Other Than War (OOTW) or stability operations, these military actions can occur before, during, and after a conflict. They may complement offensive, defensive, and support operations, or they may be the decisive operations.⁵ Until the U.S. Army published Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, it used the term MOOTW. Now, the U.S. Army refers to MOOTW as Stability Operations. According to FM 3-0, Stability Operations promote regional and global stability. Ad hoc coalitions conduct these operations with success loosely defined by the majority of participating countries. Stability Operations are limited in application of force, and may not be intended to achieve decisive results like that of combat operations. Without decisive results however, the end state can be difficult to determine. Stability Operations are an expansive grouping that encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of operations other than war from peace operations to combating terrorism.⁶ The full range of stability operations is too extensive to be evaluated within the confines of this paper.

For the purpose of this study, the author will narrow the scope to peace operations, a category of stability operations, which includes peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Legal justification for these operations generally comes from the United Nations (UN) Charter. Specifically, Chapter VI, containing articles thirty-three through thirty-eight, concerns the conciliatory settlement of disputes; and Chapter VII, articles thirty-nine through fifty-one, concerns action with respect to forceful ways of dealing with threats to peace and acts of

⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations*, DRAG, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 February 2002), 1-2.

⁶ U. S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3.0 Operations*, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, June 2001), 9-6: A complete list of stability operations includes: peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, and show of force.

aggression.⁷ Under peace enforcement, military force or the threat of its use compels compliance with resolutions or sanctions.⁸ Examples are operations conducted in Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Under peacekeeping, military operations are conducted with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.⁹ The operation in Macedonia is an example of Chapter VI. Despite being codified in the UN Charter, not all countries agree on their interpretation or application, complicating international consensus. Although the definitions appear precise and tidy, their execution is far murkier because they can easily change from one type to the other during the operation. Regardless of the type, the United States military has conducted eleven deployments that fall into the category of peace operations.

BACKGROUND OF U.S. OOTW

American military participation in operations other than war is not new. As far back as 1865, the U.S. military supported comparable operations such as the expansion of the American western frontier.

Beginning in the late nineteenth century and extending to World War II, the military helped build an American empire through interventions in places like the Philippines, Central and South America. The national strategy of the Monroe Doctrine guided military action into the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, and Costa Rica. At this time, the U.S. Marine Corps was the force of choice, and operations were called “small wars.”

After World War II and the emergence of bipolarity, the strategy of containment directed military operations to control communism, and support democracy around the world. “The

⁷ Un.org/English/; accessed December 7, 2001.

⁸ Department of Defense, *JP 3-07*, GL 4.

⁹ Ibid.

United States soon found itself intervening throughout the world in order to prevent weak and newly-formed governments from becoming communist.”¹⁰ In addition, America’s peacekeeping efforts fell under the auspices of the UN, and were kept in check by the fear of provoking a nuclear holocaust. Early operations were in the form of observer missions, which began with the 1948 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East.¹¹ Although referred to as the Korean War, the conflict operated under authority of UN Chapter VII, peace enforcement. In 1956, Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson coined the term “peacekeeping” for the United Nations Emergency Force deployed after the Arab-Israeli War to distinguish it from the smaller observer missions.¹² Since then, the term has increased in popularity and been codified in western doctrine.

Operations in Vietnam also influenced western doctrine. Failure and confusion in the Vietnam War indirectly altered the United States and its role in peace operations. An entire generation of military officers became committed to ensuring such an endless debacle would not reoccur. “It is not surprising that policy makers ever since have become increasingly wary of committing military forces in situations where political dimensions of intrastate disputes are overly complex and the military conditions uncomfortably fluid.”¹³ Further adding to this mindset was the tragic terrorist bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, 23 October 1983.¹⁴ The Marines were conducting a peacekeeping operation under the authority of the UN.¹⁵ Because of these tragedies, new guidance was sought for the application of the military instrument of national power.

¹⁰ Andrew M. Dorman and Thomas G. Otte, *Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention*, (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1995), 55.

¹¹ John Whiteclay Chambers, II, ed. *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 537.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ashley J. Tellis, “Terminating Intervention: Understanding Exit Strategy and U.S. Involvement in Intrastate Conflicts,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 118.

¹⁴ U.S. Marine Corps History, [database online] (accessed October 10, 2001); available from www.usmc.mil/history. 241 Americans died in the terrorist bombing.

¹⁵ <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetF>; [database online] (accessed 3 December 2001). The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was deployed in 1978 to monitor the withdrawal of Israeli occupation

In 1984, new guidance came from Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of Defense. He developed six criteria for “weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad.”¹⁶ Little more than a model to balance the Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity from *On War*, it had far-reaching effects.¹⁷ Prominent officers such as Colin Powell would later apply the criteria to commit military forces to crises in Panama, Grenada, Persian Gulf, and the Balkans.

The next policy change that affected the United States’ role in peace operations was the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986. The legislation’s main contribution to peace operations was that it directed the President to develop a national strategy annually and made the combatant commanders directly accountable to the President and Secretary of Defense.¹⁸ By making this law, Congress required the President to develop a national strategy that included peace operations and submit it for scrutiny.

After the Persian Gulf War, President Bush directed the Secretary of Defense to place new emphasis on peace operations to include training U.S. military units and working with the

forces from the Israeli self declared security zone in the south of Lebanon. The operation now consists of approximately 5000 troops from eight nations; U.S. pulled out shortly after the 23 October 1983 bombing.

¹⁶ Colin Powell and Joseph E. Persico. *My American Journey*, (New York: Random House, 1995.), 303. Given in a speech to the National Press Club, November 28, 1984, Weinberger’s six criteria are: 1) Commit only if our or allies vital interests are at stake; 2) if commit, do so with all the resources necessary to win; 3) go in only with clear political and military objectives; 4) be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change; 5) only take on commitments that can gain the support of the American people and the Congress; 6) commit U.S. forces only as a last resort.

¹⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89. The paradoxical trinity concerns: the people, the commander and his army, and the government. The tension between these three aspects is essentially what Weinberger’s criteria attempts to address before deploying troops.

¹⁸ U.S. Code Title 50, Section 404a, [database online] (accessed 10 December 2001), available from www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/title_10. U.S. Code Title 50, Section 404a states, “The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a “national security strategy report”). The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31. Not later than 150 days after the date on which a new President takes office, the President shall transmit to Congress a national security strategy report under this section. That report shall be in addition to the report for that year transmitted at the time specified in paragraph.” In Ted O. Kostich’s paper, “Military Operations Other Than War: The Evolution of American Strategy and Doctrine for Peace Operations,” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), he further explained the impact of Goldwater-Nichols such as: promoted unity of effort between the services, established support relationships, fixed responsibility with geographic combatant commanders, and fostered joint doctrine, 13.

UN to maximize logistics and communications.¹⁹ Later, under the strategy of engagement, President Clinton continued along this path when he signed Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25), “U.S. Policy on Reforming Multinational Peace Operations,” which solidified peacekeeping as a useful instrument to help prevent and resolve conflicts before they grow into threats to national security or adversely influenced U.S. economic interests.²⁰

Approximately three years later, President Clinton published PDD-56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” which called for all government agencies to institute lessons learned from recent peacekeeping experiences and to improve both planning and management.²¹ Despite PDD-56, the administration did not appear to follow its guidance when deploying forces for peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and East Timor, nor when conducting air strikes in Iraq, Bosnia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Serbia.²² Although U.S. strategy did not change, these documents along with the National Security Strategies signed by President Clinton clearly established the norm of committing U.S. troops to support peace operations. The United States was not alone in adapting to the new strategic environment.

With the Soviet threat of invasion minimized, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began to reexamine its purpose and develop a strategy to ensure its relevance. “Propelled by a confused mixture of good intention and a frantic desire to adapt itself to a post-Cold War world, the NATO Alliance has made itself the errand boy of ethnic secessionism in the Balkans, most recently and spectacularly in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo.”²³ According to member countries, NATO’s values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law

¹⁹ “U.S. Policy on Peace Operations,” [database online] (accessed December 12, 2001); available from www.fas.org/man/congress/1999/cbo-pko.

²⁰ William J. Clinton, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, PDD-25,” (Washington, DC: The White House, May 1994), 1.

²¹ William J. Clinton, “White Paper: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: PDD-56,” (Washington DC: The White House, 1997).

²² Rowan Scarborough, “Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions,” *Washington Times*, December 1999, page A1. A.B. Technologies in Alexandria, VA conducted a study for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

²³ Carl C. Hodge, “Woodrow Wilson in Our Time: NATO’s Goals in Kosovo,” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College), *Parameters*, Spring 2001, 125-35.

constituted the anchor that held it together.²⁴ As NATO struggled with its identity, the UN was suffering from its own loss of reputation due to humiliations in Somalia and Srebrenica.²⁵

With the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, and a shift in national strategy from containment to engagement, the future and its strategic environment reveal increased involvement in peace operations whether as part of NATO or the UN.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Stating that the Cold War is over is cliché. It has been over eleven years, and the majority of articles within professional journals and magazines still cling to this obvious fact. In a sense, it demonstrates western comfort with the past, a known enemy. Alternatively, as Alvin and Heidi Toffler argued in their book, *War and Anti-War*, blaming all of today's turmoil on the end of the Cold War is a substitute for thought.²⁶

Regardless of the cause, the age of large-scale conventional interstate warfare opened by the French Revolution appears to be over. Although this type warfare seems less likely, threats to the United States and its allies proliferate rather than diminish. Terrorist groups, transnational organizations, and regional powers pursue actions that adversely impact western culture and interests. Religious, cultural, and ethnic fault lines continue to rupture. The residue of European empires in Africa and the Asian subcontinent, populous areas like Nigeria and Pakistan, may

²⁴ Stanley R. Sloan, "Continuity or Change? The View from America," S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark R. Rubin, eds. *NATO After Fifty Years*, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001), 5.

²⁵ Pirnie and Simons, *Soldiers for Peace*, 67. Although failed operations in Somalia were well publicized, the fiasco in Srebrenica, where thousands of Bosnian civilians were massacred in a UN "safe areas" between 6-11 July 1995, was not. For a detailed account of the massacre, see Bianca Jagger, "The Betrayal of Srebrenica," *The European*, 15 September-1 October 1997, 14-19. Also, see David Rohde, *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre Since World War II*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997).

²⁶ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993), 241. For a complete explanation to the cause of upheaval, read chapter 25. Also, see Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

implode, ensuring intervention will be particularly problematic.²⁷ A scarcity of resources such as water only deepens hatreds and malevolent intentions.

As globalization spreads, international pressure and economic necessity have resulted in U.S. intervention numerous times in the past decade. As outlined in “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” dated December 1999, threats to the United States are regional or state-centered, transnational, spread of dangerous technologies, failed states, foreign intelligence collection, and environmental and health threats.²⁸ Another dimension of this environment is an increasing number of failed states and their internal conflicts. As Donald Snow illustrated in his book *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*, there are three consequences of these internal conflicts: higher levels of atrocities and inhumanity, policymakers lack an adequate conceptual understanding, and a difficulty of devising policy.²⁹

While a bipolar world afforded a sense of certainty, the known threat of communism, the multipolar environment is characterized by uncertainty and complexity. “Contemporary conflict is not only political but multinational, multiorganizational, multidimensional, and multicultural.”³⁰ Threats to the United States will likely avoid U.S. strengths and seek to attack where it is weakest. This asymmetrical method will be difficult to prepare for and even tougher to predict. In addition, the United States no longer holds a monopoly on advanced technology. Given a dwindling U.S. research and development infrastructure, America’s potential enemies have the same access to commercial technology, and are not hindered by a cumbersome defense

²⁷ Robert D. Kaplan, *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos*, (New York: Random House, 2002), 7.

²⁸ William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” (Washington DC: The White House, 1999), 5. This is even more volatile when combined with long-standing ethnic and religious divisions. For a detailed essay on this see Michael T. Klare’s, “Waging Postindustrial Warfare on the Global Battlefield,” *Current History*, December 2001, 436.

²⁹ Donald M. Snow, 146.

³⁰ Max G. Manwaring, “Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia,” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College), *Parameters*, Winter 1998, 2.

contracting system.³¹ The proliferation of technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threatens the security of the United States. Finally, threats will not likely adhere to western ideas of justice or international standards such as the Geneva Convention as seen recently when four U.S. commercial airlines were used to murder civilians on September 11, 2001.

The author concedes that forecasting the future accurately is virtually impossible. As globalization and economics draw the world closer together however, it appears the expectation for U.S. intervention to confront these challenges will increase. “At this moment in history, the United States is called upon to lead-to marshal the forces of freedom and progress; to channel the energies of the global economy into lasting prosperity; to reinforce our democratic ideals and values; to enhance American security and global peace.”³² What is the impact of these interventions on the United States military?

RELEVANCE OF END STATE

As the Clausewitz wrote, “No one starts a war-or rather no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter is its operational objective.”³³

Although written in the age of Napoleonic Warfare, Clausewitz’s point is still appropriate, and applies not just to war, but also for peace operations. Today, there appear to be more threats to the United States over a seemingly endless list of issues. This complex strategic environment, coupled with the U.S. trend of increased peace operation deployments, support continued U.S. involvement in conflicts outside its vital interests.

As the United States continues to become engaged in peace operations, it is imperative to understand how better to implement end states so that these peace operations do not become

³¹ Ashton B. Carter, “Keeping America’s Military Edge,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2001, 100. The author of this article details the necessity of the U.S. military to adapt to a changing environment in order to remain the world’s premier force.

³² William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” 5.

unending commitments and tie up precious resources. Piecemeal commitment of American military forces around the globe impacts readiness, not just abroad, but at home.

The Department of the Army tasked U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to conduct a study on the effect of peace operations on unit readiness for combat operations. The study identified several factors that affect a unit's ability to return to training proficiency, but generally, it took four to six months after their return home.³⁴ As COL Thomas Spoehr accurately explained, "to maintain one infantry battalion in the Sinai in fact involves three infantry battalions; one in a four to five month training cycle preparing for deployment, the one deployed in the Sinai, and the one in a four to six month recovery period, retraining from the Sinai rotation."³⁵ Envision the impact of a brigade-size (three infantry and/or armor battalions and necessary support units such as aviation, air defense, military police, intelligence, transportation, and logistics) rotation like that in Bosnia or in Kosovo. This simple example does not address the division-size headquarters elements needed to command these forces and the large area of operations for which they are responsible, nor does it exclusively impact the Army.

The Kosovo air campaign was extremely resource intensive for the U.S. Air Force, resembling the activity expected in a Major Theater of War (MTW).³⁶ Each U.S. military service bears its own burden with regards to support of peace operations. "Those outside the military are only now coming to appreciate fully the cumulative effect of multiple, simultaneous peace operations on readiness. The ability to see peace operations through presumes that there is no

³³ Carl von Clausewitz, 102.

³⁴ [Call.army.mil/products/spc_sdy/unitrdy/execsumm.htm](http://call.army.mil/products/spc_sdy/unitrdy/execsumm.htm), [database online] (accessed December 10, 2001). HQDA, ODSCOPS (DAMO-SSW) tasked TRADOC to provide working timelines for units to prepare for peace operations and return to predeployment readiness. Some of the factors identified are: equipment left in theater (for follow on units or UN), personnel turbulence, availability of training areas, and the degradation of complex collective training skills. It is important to note that each peace operation is unique. Train up includes individual training such as mine training, marksmanship, and Rules of Engagement, small unit training such as squad drills and gunnery. Training culminates with a mission rehearsal exercise at one of the U.S. training centers.

³⁵ Thomas Spoehr, "This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the US Commitment to the MFO." (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College), *Parameters*, Autumn, 2000, 7.

larger, more pressing security challenge elsewhere.”³⁷ Given the strategic environment, the piecemeal commitment of U.S. military forces tied to peace operations may not be advisable.

This author is not advocating that the United States become isolationist and avoid participation in peace operations. On the contrary, the author assumes participation is a given. The noted author, Samuel P. Huntington, stated in his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*, “the United States can neither dominate nor escape the world. Neither internationalism nor isolationism, neither multilateralism nor unilateralism, will best serve its interests.”³⁸ Engagement is a necessary responsibility, especially considering U.S. hegemony, and interest to promote globalization. The primary mission of the military is deterrence however, and when necessary, to fight and win the nation’s wars. Perhaps William Cohen, former Secretary of Defense under President Clinton, said it best at his swearing in, “We ought to be very careful in terms of how we employ them (military) and where we deploy them. Our force is there to defend American vital interest, and important interests, and not to overindulge ourselves in employing them to humanitarian and other types of operations.”³⁹ Within the context of U.S. current force structure and the threat, the U.S. military must maintain its readiness, prepared to execute the full range of operations.

As Ralph Peters soberly warned in his book *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph*, “By the middle of the next century, if not before, the overarching mission of our military will be the preservation of our quality of life.”⁴⁰ The ability of operational planners to define an end state in peace operations is fundamental to the readiness of the United States military. Ashley Tellis explained,

³⁶ Walter N. Anderson, “Peace with Honor: Enduring Truths, Lessons Learned and Implications for a Durable Peace.” (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 1999), 17.

³⁷ Ibid, 6.

³⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, 312.

³⁹ Associated Press, “Cohen Sworn In, Cites Caution on Humanitarian Missions,” *The Boston Globe*, 25 January 1997, A6. Taken from LTC Christopher Fleck’s paper, “Just Do Something: Measuring and Achieving Operational Success in Peace Operations, 15.

Without such a conceptual image of what is to be attained at both the political and military levels, it is difficult to assess whether the use of military forces is warranted to begin with and, if warranted, what the missions should be and how the success of that mission is to be evaluated; what logistical demands are imposed on planners tasked with orchestrating the forces required to execute the mission; what campaign and tactical objectives must be pursued in order that the mission may be fulfilled; and finally, whether the mission should be terminated in the face of success or lack thereof, or altered in the pursuit of some new, previously unintended objectives.⁴¹

Operational planners can no longer look at defining the problem with the nation-state paradigm in mind or from the viewpoint of unlimited resources. Future conflicts will most likely be intrastate and not between nation-states. There will be “no definable military force to face, no specific territory to control, no single part of society on which to concentrate, and no wholly legitimate government with which to work.”⁴² This environment demands that operational planners develop achievable campaign plans based on end states that once attained allow U.S. forces to redeploy, retrain, and a return to readiness. Ill-defined operations lead to the commitment and potential wasting of precious resources.

Given this environment, operational planners continue to struggle with translating strategic guidance into achievable operational objectives, and unambiguous end states. All of which are essential elements of a campaign plan. The ability of operational planners to define an end state is fundamental to the readiness of the United States military, whether for deterrence, fighting a major theater of war, or conducting further peace operations. Clarifying current doctrine will not resolve these challenges in operational planning, but it is a start point, and may minimize some confusion, while enabling military planners to develop clear, attainable end states.

METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA

This monograph does not assess the strategic decisions to become involved in operations other than war nor explore the execution of post-conflict resolution. Neither topic can be fully

⁴⁰ Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph*, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 17.

⁴¹ Tellis, 119.

examined within the limits of this paper. Focus is within the domain of operational art, the development of peace operation campaign plans and their end states. In order to lay a foundation for assessing the problem, the operational level of war and its applicable terms are defined. Both Army and joint doctrine are assessed to explore if appropriate tools are available to support the military planner in defining an operational end state. The term end state is evaluated using two criteria, theoretical and historical.

From the theoretical perspective, the author examines goal setting, problem solving, and the role of intent. The importance of establishing an end state and whether it provides focus for an organization is also explored. After a theoretical foundation is laid, historical examples are examined.

From the historical perspective, two case studies, Bosnia and Kosovo, are evaluated to assess the role of end state in planning. These examples of peace operations were selected because they are similar in mission, and are currently ongoing. In addition, they symbolize the type of stability operations that the United States is mainly involved with, post-conflict, multinational under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or as part of the United Nations (UN). It is difficult to compare the two operations because no two are identical; each offers its own set of different variables. By studying the strategic guidance and operational planning for the two operations however, it can be determined if an operational end state was developed, how it was used for planning, and if it was effective.

Finally, the author offers recommendations to improve both Army and joint doctrine in order to minimize confusion over the development of an end state.

⁴² Manwaring, 6.

CHAPTER TWO

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a doctrinal foundation by defining applicable terms and explaining concepts such as the operational level of war, operational art, and campaign planning. In addition, it provides a brief background on operational art for both understanding and perspective. Finally, a review of service and joint doctrine addresses how adequate they tackle peacekeeping operations and the use of end state in operational planning.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Even within a particular military service there is misuse or confusion over terms. In order to discuss the role of end state in the operational planning of peace operations, it is first important to define appropriate terms for clarity. In this paper, the following terms will be used:

Campaign is a related series of military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. They are inherently joint.⁴³

Conflict termination is an essential link between national strategy, military strategy, and the desired outcome. “Conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination.”⁴⁴

End state is “What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude-both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power.”⁴⁵ It is interchangeable with the terms goal, objective, and military conditions.

⁴³ Department of Defense, JP 3.0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington: Office of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), III-4, 5.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 1-9 and 1-10.

⁴⁵ Department of Defense, JP 3-07 *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW*, GL-3.

Strategic Level of War is that level of war where a nation, often as a member of an alliance or coalition, determines strategic security objectives, and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives.⁴⁶

Operational Level of War is the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. It links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.⁴⁷

Globalization is a term coined by Thomas L. Friedman, journalist and author, in his book, *The Lexus and The Olive Tree*. It contrasts sharply with the Cold War era, and is summed up in one word, integration. Changes in how the world communicates, invests, and learns are causing walls to erode. The primary tool is the Internet, web, and the compelling idea is free-market capitalism.⁴⁸

BACKGROUND OF OPERATIONAL ART

According to U.S. military doctrine there are three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic. This was not always the case. The operational level of war is a newcomer to the west, not accepted into U.S. doctrine until the early eighties. The Russian soldier and military historian, Aleksandr A. Svechin, first introduced the concept in 1927 during a series of strategy lectures. He defined operational art as the bridge between tactics and strategy.⁴⁹ The concept evolved over time from the realization that warfare had changed, and the scope of military operations had grown. Gone were the days of a single decisive victory like that of Napoleon at Ulm-Austerlitz. Warfare stretched into a series of battles, and began to grow in time, space, and

⁴⁶ Department of Defense, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, II-2.

⁴⁷ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2-2.

⁴⁸ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and The Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, (New York: Anchor Books, April 2000). The definition of globalization is described throughout his entire book, but Chapter One offers a brief description.

depth. The Industrial Revolution introduced technological changes that significantly impacted the battlefield. According to Dr. James Schneider, theory instructor at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), “the transformation occurred at two levels. At the tactical level, the rifled musket, breech loading mechanism, magazine, barbed wire, and smokeless powder changed the conduct of battles. At the operational level, the railroad, telegraph, and modern market infrastructure completed the revolution in warfare.”⁵⁰ Because the dimension, duration, and scope of warfare changed, the resources required to prosecute war dramatically increased.

From these changes developed a polarity between the tactics required to win battles and the political-military strategy required to win wars. This polarization created a tension. Using the Universal Systems Theory, Shimon Naveh, lecturer in the Department of History at Tel Aviv University, explained, “The substance of the operational plan consists of the strategic aim, which indicates a predetermined definition of the entire operational accomplishment. The division of the aim into operational objectives and tactical missions creates the cognitive tension that moves the system towards its final objectives.”⁵¹ Without this tension, strategy is doomed to fail. For no matter how many battles are won, if they do not fit together to accomplish operational objectives, of which will achieve a strategic aim, failure results. World War One and early World War Two are fraught with numerous historical examples where extraordinary battles were won, but did little to achieve strategic goals. A popular example is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Although a tactical success, it did little to achieve any strategic goal or aim, and ultimately led to defeat. As for operations other than war, the Marine tragedy in

⁴⁹ Aleksandr A. Svechin, *Strategy*, (Minnesota: East View Publications, 1992), 37.

⁵⁰ James J. Schneider, “Operational Art and the Revolution in Warfare,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 31 March 1993), 4-5.

⁵¹ Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, (Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), L. von Bertalanffy’s Universal Systems Theory essentially describes a system as a complex interaction of many different variables. In order to understand a system, one must understand the interaction of the variables. Naveh defines it on pages 5-9.

Lebanon, October 22, 1983, highlights a fatal example of an operation without a strategic aim and a clear end state.⁵²

The rationale of operational art is to supply the operational commander a framework for analysis of a problem given to him by the National Command Authority (NCA). Although there are essential elements of science in this process such as the need to thoroughly understand the technical capabilities of both friendly and enemy equipment, the intangible of art is much more prevalent. By applying this concept, an operational blueprint or campaign plan, composed of the elements of operational design, is developed and used to accomplish a strategic aim.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

When directed by the NCA to conduct military operations that achieve conditions to support a strategic aim, the operational commander either modifies an existing plan, deliberate planning, or develops a new one, crisis action planning, within a prescribed, unified planning process called Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).⁵³ The product is a campaign plan.

A campaign plan is expressed in terms of military conditions (ends) that must be accomplished to achieve the political objective, strategic aim or goal, the sequence of actions (ways) to produce the conditions, and how the resources (means) should be applied to accomplish the sequence of actions. The operational commander takes the guidance from the NCA and translates it into quantifiable operational objectives. The first step can complicate the entire process because strategic guidance from the NCA can be vague. How is operational success to be defined when the political guidance is vague? Herein lie the realm of operational art and the

⁵² Richard E. MacNealy, "Operational Art: Your End State Is Your Start Point," (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 18 June 1993), 16. The author is not implying this was the only cause of the Marine tragedy, but that it was one reason identified by the 20 December 1983 report.

⁵³ Department of Defense, JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, (Washington: Office of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995), III-3.

challenge of campaign planning. In addition, the military is but one of the instruments of national power. In campaign planning, the operational commander must synchronize the military with the other instruments of national power such as diplomatic, informational, and economic. Each of these instruments will have objectives that once achieved, set conditions for the end state.

Several U.S. military publications deal with campaign planning and offer guidance, but do not advocate a clear process on how to translate strategic guidance into operational objectives or how to synchronize the instruments of national power.

DOCTRINAL REVIEW

JOINT DOCTRINE

There are two primary publications for planning U.S. joint operations: Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* and Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. JP 3-0, published February 1995, is the centerpiece for joint operations. It describes how to think about directing, planning, and conducting joint, multinational, and interagency operations across the range of military operations.⁵⁴ JP 5-0, published 13 April 1995, is the foundation for U.S. military joint planning. Intended as a guide, it explains that campaign planning has the greatest function for combat operations, but is also useful for operations other than war. Although there is no mention of end state, it is implied by “clearly define what constitutes success,” listed as one of the fundamentals of campaign plans.⁵⁵ Beyond that, the publication does not address end state, its role in peace operations or campaign planning.

Joint Publication 3-0 has an entire page dedicated to end state. Of note, “The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action. End state is described as the set of required conditions that achieve the

⁵⁴ Department of Defense, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington: Office of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), xvii.

⁵⁵ Department of Defense, JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, II-19, 20.

strategic objectives.”⁵⁶ The publication explains that defining an end state that supports national objectives is the critical first step in the planning process. Furthermore, commanders at each level should have a common understanding of the conditions that define success before initiation of the operation. As in Joint Publication 5-0, JP 3-0 includes *Fundamentals of Campaign Plans*, which infers the importance of end state. JP 3-0 also includes the *Facets of Operational Art* that does not include end state.⁵⁷ Although JP 3-0 explains the many components of campaign planning, like JP 5-0, it does not explain a process for developing a campaign plan.

Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, published June 1995, explains how military operations other than war differ from war. It is a useful manual for gaining an appreciation of these operations, and learning the multitude of operations that fall under this category. It provides basic principles such as: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.⁵⁸ As LTC Ted Kostich identified however, two of the principles, legitimacy and perseverance, mainly fall outside the realm of the military, and should be prerequisites for commitment rather than buzzwords for execution.⁵⁹ Chapter III, Section 7, lists planning considerations, but there is no reference to any of the elements of operational art found in JP 3-0 such as center of gravity, decisive points, termination, culmination, and simultaneity and depth.⁶⁰ Certainly, these concepts have relevance in peace operations. Despite the importance of end state in planning, the term is only listed in the glossary. Finally, adding to the vagueness, JP 3-07 has its own set of fundamentals, which differ from the JP 3-0 fundamentals of campaign plans mentioned in the previous.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Department of Defense, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, III-2.

⁵⁷ Ibid, III-10.

⁵⁸ Department of Defense, JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, II-1.

⁵⁹ Ted O. Kostich, “Military Operations Other Than War: The Evolution of American Strategy and Doctrine for Peace Operations,” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 20.

⁶⁰ Department of Defense, JP 3-0, 9-24. Adding further confusion, whereas JP 3-0 calls these terms “elements of operational art” FM 3-0, supposedly nested with JP 3-0, calls them “elements of operational design.”

⁶¹ Department of Defense, JP 3-07, II-4.

Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Doctrine for Stability and Support Operations*, published February 12, 1999, provides a detailed description of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. There is a chapter dedicated to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. JP 3-07.3 provides battlefield functional area considerations, which may be useful when conducting mission analysis. It describes that employment of forces normally are in accordance with a detailed campaign plan that includes the desired end state.⁶² The manual has its own array of fundamentals, commander's directive elements, standing operating procedures, and planning considerations, which may confuse an operational planner.

The *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, published June 1997 by the Joint Warfighting Center, is a marked improvement over JP 3-07. However, shortfalls remain in the area of operational planning and end state development. Based on lessons learned from recent deployments, it describes the fundamental elements of peacekeeping operations such as the importance of civil-military relations, responsibilities of the Joint Force Commander, the different types of support required, and training requirements. In Chapter 1, the handbook describes the importance of continuous mission analysis, and that once a mission is developed, it should be coordinated with the higher political authorities.⁶³ This is vital in order to get the NCA's approval. Although the handbook clearly conveys the importance of defining an end state as part of the mission analysis process, it falls short there after. It is vague on how to develop an end state. It complicates matters by stating that "an end state will not always be clearly defined or that what is defined may be arbitrary or unrealistic," only to state two paragraphs later that "without a clearly defined end state, your component commanders and other multinational members cannot develop or define their implementing and supporting tasks."⁶⁴

⁶² Department of Defense, JP 3-07.3, *Joint Doctrine for Stability and Support Operations*, (Washington: Office of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 February 1999), III-8.

⁶³ U. S. Department of Defense, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, (Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997), I-6.

⁶⁴ Ibid, I-13.

ARMY

Formerly known as Field Manual (FM) 100-5, FM 3-0 *Operations* did not mention stability operations until the 1962 version, referring to them as “situations short of war.”⁶⁵ Interesting enough, the 1976 version of FM 100-5 erased all reference to stability operations, and it was not until the 1986 version that it appeared again in the form of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW). Finally, the term end state was introduced in the 1998 version of FM 100-5, although it could previously be inferred from the Principle of War, objective.

A review of FM 3-0 indicates genuine discussion on campaign planning and elements of operational design. Aside from the concepts however, there is no indication on how to tie them together into a coherent operational plan. End state is listed as part of operational design, “At the operational and tactical levels, the end state is the conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. At the operational level, these conditions attain the aims set for the campaign or operation.” However, on the next page it explains, “In many operations-particularly short-notice, smaller-scale contingencies-the end state and supporting military conditions may be poorly defined or entirely absent. In other operations, the end state may be vague or evolving.”⁶⁶

If the end state has not been defined or is vague, how can the operational commander develop a sequence of actions or determine the required resources to accomplish his mission? By having this ambiguity in doctrine, it appears acceptable to deploy troops without doing the required analysis. Granted, the end state may later be modified based on the political environment, but it provides initial focus for military forces. Finally, the manual implies that in short-notice, smaller-scale contingencies it is acceptable not to have an end state. How do you plan ways and means without an end state?

⁶⁵ Ted O. Kostich, “Military Operations Other Than War: The Evolution of American Strategy and Doctrine for Peace Operations,” 10.

⁶⁶ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-7.

Field Manual 100-23 *Peace Operations*, published in 1994, is primarily based on peace operations in Somalia, Macedonia, the Sinai, Croatia, and humanitarian missions in Bosnia.⁶⁷ “This document is strongly influenced by often distorted lessons from the peacekeeping operation in Somalia.”⁶⁸ Unfortunately, the manual is sufficiently dated to prevent its usefulness. Of note however, Chapter Three states the campaign plan is an essential tool for linking the mission to the desired end state, and provides a definable path to end state.⁶⁹ As part of the U.S. Army’s efforts to align its publications with joint doctrine, a new, updated publication, FM 3-07 *Stability and Support Operations*, incorporates FM 100-23. The new manual is currently going through final staffing.

FM 3-07 is a distinct improvement over FM 100-23, and reflects the U.S. Army’s learning curve in stability operations. It provides an excellent overview of stability and support operations. Beginning with a historical background, the manual provides a useful description on the rudiments of instability and planning considerations for each Battlefield Operating System (BOS) such as maneuver, intelligence, and air defense. More importantly, the manual describes potential tasks associated with the different types of stability and support operations. The manual is conceptual however, and does not provide any Tactics, Techniques, or Procedures (TTP). It defers to other joint and Army publications.⁷⁰ There is no reference on how to build a campaign plan for stability and support operations. When describing the contemporary situation, it does accurately state the root of the problem when dealing with an end state. “Unresolved political issues, an unclear understanding or description of a desired end state, or difficulty in gaining international consensus may cause ambiguity.”⁷¹ However, it offers little in the way of guidance

⁶⁷ U. S. Department of the Army, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 1994), v.

⁶⁸ Alexander Woodcock and David Davis, *Analysis for Peace Operation*, (Clementsport, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1998), 141.

⁶⁹ U. S. Department of the Army, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 31.

⁷⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations*, DRAG, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 February 2002), v. Unfortunately, the deferment is flawed. As will be evident in this paper’s doctrinal review, other manuals, whether joint or service, do not provide useful TTPs.

⁷¹ Ibid, 1-9.

on how to deal with these challenges. It echoes the same fundamentals and lists as other manuals, but further diffuses the subject by adding its own “characteristics.”⁷² Finally, Appendix A, Interagency Coordination, and Appendix C, Rules of Engagement, are helpful references.⁷³

AIR FORCE

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*, dated 3 July 2000, is fairly comprehensive, and an accurate reflection of joint publications. In Chapter 1, it lists the principles of MOOTW, but not how they apply to the U.S. Air Force. There is no mention of campaign planning, nor the importance and role of end state. Chapter 2 describes the Air Force’s role in three categories of MOOTW: combat operations, overlapping operations, and noncombatant operations.⁷⁴ Finally, the last three chapters deal with command and control, planning and support, and training and education. They are informative, but do not aid the operational planner.

NAVY

Naval Doctrine Publication 1: *Naval Warfare*, dated 28 March 1994, devotes three pages to naval operations other than war. Support of peace operations is not specifically mentioned except for providing assistance in peacetime activities. “Application of our expertise in operations other than war also exercises many of our wartime capabilities and our ability to accomplish our Service roles in defense of our nation.”⁷⁵ In other words, unlike land operations,

⁷² Ibid, 1-14. The characteristics include political objectives, modified concept of the enemy, joint, interagency, and multinational coordination, risk of mission creep, noncombatants, nongovernmental organizations, information intensity, constraints, and cross-cultural interaction. While these characteristics are relevant, it is the opinion of the author that the incorporation of another list does little to aid the operational commander or planner.

⁷³ Ibid. Appendix A, Interagency Coordination, provides an excellent overview on the organization and responsibilities at the strategic level. Appendix B, Rules of Engagement, explains the components and considerations when developing Rules of Engagement.

⁷⁴ Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3*, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 3 July 2000), 11-29.

⁷⁵ Department of the Navy, *Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare*, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Navy, 28 March 1994), page 22.

naval support of peace operations does not differ that significantly from combat operations. For the purpose of this paper, the author did not review classified naval doctrine.

MARINE CORPS

Neither OOTW or stability operations, are mentioned in available Marine Corps manuals. There is however, a practical description of operational art and campaign planning. For example,

Given the strategic aim as our destination, our next step is to determine the desired **end state**, the military conditions we must realize in order to reach that destination, those necessary conditions, which we expect by their existence, will provide us our established aim... From the envisioned **end state** we can develop the operational objectives which, taken in combination, will achieve those conditions.⁷⁶

In other words, take the strategic aim and develop the end state. After establishing the end state, backwards plan to develop the necessary conditions to achieve the end state. As for peace operations, little has been written since the Marine Corps 1940 *Small Wars* manual, despite their involvement in numerous peace operations.

SUMMARY

Whether as an outcome of the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, World War One, or simply an evolution from all three, the operational level of war is the critical bond that links tactics to strategy. For simplicity and clarification, imagine a chain with three links. The middle, essential link is the operational level of war that connects tactics to strategy. Without this link, chances are that tactics will not lead to the strategic conclusion, the aim, which is required.⁷⁷ Although intuitive, the operational link is just as necessary when planning peace operations because considerations of ends, ways, and means are especially applicable.

⁷⁶ Department of the Navy, US Marine Corps, *Campaigning*, FMFM 1-1, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Navy), 1 August 1997, 33-35.

⁷⁷ Ash Irwin, "The Levels of War: Operational Art and Campaign Planning," Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper, (Camberley: Colonel Higher Command and Staff College, 1993), 7.

As for U.S. military doctrine and peace operations, there has been a significant improvement, but vagueness and ambiguity are still evident. While informative, the array of lists describing fundamentals, principles, characteristics, and imperatives assists the operational planner little in developing a peace operation campaign plan. The author is not advocating prescriptive doctrine. However, a more detailed description of how to develop an end state and the sequence of actions to achieve that end state would be useful. This would certainly allow for a more efficient use of resources.

The next chapter reviews the theoretical basis for goal setting. By understanding the theoretical importance of goal setting in planning, the significance of end state in problem solving is evident.

CHAPTER THREE

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the importance of setting a goal and developing a vision. In addition, failures in problem solving and decision-making are reviewed.

GOAL SETTING AND PROBLEM SOLVING

Whether planning a military operation or vacation, a goal or end state is developed in order to focus planning and facilitate success. It provides direction, and once shared, unity of effort. “Where individuals are collectively concerned, unity of effort is the most important single factor contributory to the common success.”⁷⁸

In Dietrich Dorner’s book *The Logic of Failure*, he analyzed the nature of thinking in regards to dealing with complex problems. His premise is that failure doesn’t just happen, but develops over time. Decision-makers inadvertently encourage failure through their attempts at problem solving, and by understanding the shortfalls, “we will be much better problem solvers.”⁷⁹ It is important that goals are not vague, unclear, and lacking criterion. In his monograph title “In Pursuit of the Endstate-What’s All the Fuss,” George Woods used Organization Theory to support his premise that effective goal setting enhances performance, and goal specificity positively affects human performance.⁸⁰ Of course, the challenge is determining a clear goal given a complex system composed of many different variables, each interacting differently and influencing each other.

To develop a clear goal, it is imperative to conduct a thorough analysis of the problem and an understanding of the causal relationships between variables. However, this still will not

⁷⁸ U. S. Department of the Navy, “Sound Military Decisions,” (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 21 September 1942), 12.

⁷⁹ Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1989), 10.

⁸⁰ George J. Woods, “In Pursuit of the Endstate-What’s All the Fuss?” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 14 May 1993), 25.

alleviate all the confusion. Dorner uses a chess game analogy to stress the idea, “Should a player, even before the opening move, set a specific goal that will guide his strategy for the whole game? I want his king on H-1 and my queen on D-2, protected by a bishop on G-3.”⁸¹ This analogy highlights the absurdity of providing that much goal detail. Complex systems like that of peace operations are not static. They are dynamic, making absolute certainty in planning impossible.

In his book, *The Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*, Gary Klein studied decision-making based on observations of human interaction outside the laboratory using the experiences of fire fighters, pilots, nurses, and the military. Based on those observations, he determined, “Because it is impossible to achieve 100 percent certainty, decision makers must be able to proceed without having full understanding of events.”⁸² Planners must be able to take available information, define a goal, and develop a sequence of actions to achieve it. Dorner stresses “If we want to deal rationally with a complex system, the first thing we do is define our goals clearly.”⁸³ The next step is to think through the sequence of actions to determine if those actions bring us closer to the desired goal.

In order to account for the changing environment, planners may develop a set of interim goals or objectives and a sequence of actions that ultimately lead to completion of the end state. Towards that end, identification and assessment of measures of effectiveness facilitate success.⁸⁴ When necessary, modifications may have to be made in order to correct for changes in the environment, adapt for uncertainty, and ultimately to achieve the desired goal or end state.

⁸¹ Dorner, *The Logic of Failure*, 53.

⁸² Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*, (London, England: MIT Press, 1999), 276.

⁸³ Dorner, 153.

⁸⁴ A description of Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) is detailed in Nicholas J Lambert’s essay, “Operational Analysis in the Field: The Utility of Campaign Monitoring to the IFOR Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995-1996,” located in Alexander Woodcock and David Davis’ *Analysis for Peace Operations*, (Clementsport, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1998), 323. According to his essay, there are five types of Measures of Effectiveness that can be used: level of effort MOEs, task performance MOEs, mission level MOEs, transition MOEs, and general indicators. These five types are based on a study conducted by the U.S. Marine Corps, and are detailed in Nelson J. and S.L. Newlett, J.T. Dworken, K.A.W. McGrady, and K. LaMon, *Measures of Effectiveness for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, (Center for Naval Analysis, CRM95-166.10, April 1996). As Mr. Lambert aptly stated, MOEs can assist in assessing progress towards an end state.

In addition, establishing a goal or end state allows for the planning of resources. A common shortfall is to immediately start planning actions rather than defining the goal.⁸⁵ Without careful consideration and analysis of the ends, it is not possible to accurately assess a problem. Opinions on the contrary argue that demanding a detailed goal or end state upfront is unrealistic, and in the case of military operations, distorts civil-military responsibilities. “Uniformed personnel should not directly or indirectly seek to frame major policy debates by demanding that civilian leaders provide a detailed picture of any particular conflict’s eventual outcome. Such foresight does not exist in the real world.”⁸⁶ The author concedes that this process is not uncomplicated. This does not mean establishing a goal is futile. On the contrary, “If particular actions are not informed by an overall conception, behavior will respond only to the demand of the moment.”⁸⁷

Compounding the challenge of problem solving and goal development is the human failing to avoid the mental effort involved in thinking through problems, and to rely on rules or principles which do not express the whole truth.⁸⁸ When a problem is not thoroughly analyzed and subsequently, a goal defined, decision-makers fall into the trap of “repair service behavior.” Because they have no idea what their goal means, they seek to fix the obvious problems, solutions of which may cause more problems later.⁸⁹ The solution to both of these challenges is to develop a picture of the goal (or end state), establish intermediate goals, and to continually reassess them.

The concept of a goal or end state in planning is critical. It allows planning to proceed backwards from the desired end state, and it is essential to the concept of commander’s intent.⁹⁰

⁸⁵ Dorner, 186.

⁸⁶ James H. Anderson, “End State Pitfalls: A Strategic Perspective,” *Military Review*, September/October, 1997.

⁸⁷ Dorner, 53.

⁸⁸ U.S. Naval War College, 24.

⁸⁹ Dorner, 59.

⁹⁰ Trevor A. Snellgrove, “The Elusive Pursuit of an End State,” (Naval War College, 17 May 1999), 1. In this monograph, the author argues that demanding a clearly defined end state is unrealistic due to uncertainty, and waiting for that certainty can cause a harmful delay. However, the author spends the remainder of the paper arguing the importance of end states in planning, concluding that military commanders must not be surprised if their end states are not clear.

Once a goal has been identified and examined thoroughly, it is important to convey that goal or end state to the organization.

ROLE OF INTENT

Within organizations, a critical element of problem solving is to communicate intent. Klein explains its importance for organizations by explaining that intent allows team members to operate more independently and improvise as they feel is required.⁹¹ Intent should be clear, concise, and convey the conditions the organization must meet in respect to the threat, terrain, and the desired end state.⁹² A clear intent containing the organization's goal provides direction and further allows for unity of effort. As Klein explains, a common trait among effective, experienced teams is that they want to know as much as possible about the goal. In contrast, an immature team does not want to be bothered by the goal. They only worry about their jobs, and are shortsighted.⁹³

A clearly defined goal or end state encapsulated within intent does not just benefit the military. In the complex environment of peace operations, the military is just one of the many different agencies involved. In this environment, there is tremendous need for interagency coordination not just within the United States and its instruments of national power, but also among other countries. A clearly defined end state facilitates unity of effort among the different agencies.⁹⁴

SUMMARY

The relevance of this chapter is twofold. First, the military term end state is interchangeable with goal. By understanding the theoretical importance of goal setting, the

⁹¹ Klein, 222.

⁹² Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-14.

⁹³ Klein, 242.

⁹⁴ Stephen A. Clark, "Interagency Coordination: Strengthening the Link between Operational Art and the Desired End State." (Naval War College, 8 February 1999), 16-17.

significance of end state in problem solving is evident. If the author is able to make the connection between a goal and an end state, the futility of planning without one should be apparent. “Theory and historical analysis suggest that the presence of an operational end state is so critical to the proper conduct of operational warfare and strategic success that the military commander must determine a proper end state regardless of obscurity or uncertainty within the political environment.”⁹⁵

Second, despite the difficulties and challenges imposed by the complexities of peace operations, an operational commander must be able to develop a clear plan including an end state from strategic guidance. If not, how does the commander know or assess progress? A commander is better able to deal with the friction, “shocks and frustrations of field operation when he understands what he is expected to accomplish.”⁹⁶ An analysis of the ongoing peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo may provide insight into the challenges of developing an end state.

⁹⁵ Frederic E. Abt, “The Operational End State: Cornerstone of the Operational Level of War,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 6 May 1988), 33. The author analyzes U.S. operations in the Korean Conflict, the 1961 Cuban “Bay of Pigs,” 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention, and the Vietnam War.

⁹⁶ Pirnie, Bruce R. and William E. Simons, 4.

CHAPTER FOUR: BOSNIA

“I’m absolutely convinced that America will not participate with military forces in Bosnia after the conclusion of this year. I cannot imagine circumstances changing in such a way that we would remain in Bosnia.”⁹⁷

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze U.S. military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina by providing a brief background of the Balkan problem, specifically, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and examining how it was defined through strategic guidance and operational planning. Finally, it will determine the degree of end state development, and its effectiveness.

BACKGROUND

Before reviewing the application of military force, it is first important to gain an appreciation of the problem. The Balkans region has a distinctive history. Ruled for two thousand years by a series of empires, Southeastern Europe straddled the separation between eastern and western Christianity, and the junction where Islam and Christianity met. This helped produce a mosaic of peoples, cultures, and languages.⁹⁸ Formed after World War I, the Yugoslavia state is composed of a diverse patchwork of cultures, ethnic groups, religions, and histories.⁹⁹ There are numerous actors in the region. The first of which is the ethnic groups: Serbs (Orthodox Christians), Muslims (similar Slavic origin to the Serbs and Croats), and the Croats (Roman Catholic faith). Then there are factions: Bosnian Army (primarily Muslim), Bosnian Croats (united to Bosnian forces), the Croatian government, the Bosnian Serbs (rebels supported by Yugoslavia), and the Croatian Serbs.¹⁰⁰ A half Slovene, half Croat communist by

⁹⁷ General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 April 1996, *The Washington Post*, 3 April 1996, A1.

⁹⁸ Carl Bildt, “A Second Chance in the Balkans,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2001, 149.

⁹⁹ William T. Johnsen, “Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Taken from an article by Steven Metz, “The American Army in the Balkans: Strategical Alternatives and Implications,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2.

¹⁰⁰ Larry Wentz, *Lessons Learned from Bosnia*, National Defense University, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997), 10.

the name of Josep Broz, better known as Tito, held this patchwork together from 1953 until 1980 through his severe method of totalitarianism, personality, and strict rules against ethnic nationalism.¹⁰¹

Stability began to fall apart after Tito's death in 1980, gaining momentum with the collapse of communism in 1989. With a weakening economy in the background, ethnic nationalism filled a vacuum fanned by characters such as Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia's Franjo Tudjman. Milosevic's call for a "Greater Serbia" caused Croatia and Slovenia to militarize. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1992, leaving only Serbia and Montenegro.

The first wave of violence began in the north with Slovenia and Croatia. Because of the small number of Serbs living inside Slovenia, its independence was essentially painless. Croatia was not as fortunate. Fighting against the Federal Yugoslav Army (JNA) was bitter. Atrocities were committed on both sides, causing international intervention, and three UN sponsored cease-fires, none of which stopped the violence.¹⁰² The United Nations attempted to mediate between the warring parties, but dozens of cease-fires failed, and over time, more than 45,000 peacekeepers ended up in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁰³ Those peacekeepers, known collectively as UN Protective Forces (UNPROFOR), were initially deployed to Croatia in 1992. Authorized for one year, the UN extended them several times.¹⁰⁴ Across the border from Croatia, the situation in Bosnia was worse.

¹⁰¹ "Recent History: Nationalism and War," www.megastories.com/bosnia/history/recent; accessed February 14, 2002. For example, Tito sacked and imprisoned Franjo Tudjman, later Croatian president, in the late 1960s for nationalism.

¹⁰² Steven Metz, "The American Army in the Balkans: Strategical Alternatives and Implications," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, pages 4-6.

¹⁰³ Larry Wentz, 1.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. For a detailed account of UN participation in the Balkan region, refer to Chapter One of this document.

In Bosnia, the situation was complex due to evenly split demographics: Serbs-40%, Bosnian Muslims known as “Bosniaks”-38%, and Croats-22%.¹⁰⁵ In an election largely boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, a remaining majority voted for independence from Yugoslavia. The Serbs, backed by the JNA, responded, seized two-thirds of Bosnia, and initiated the next wave of violence including increased atrocities. Most notable was the carnage committed under the leadership of individuals like Radovan Karadzic, former Bosnian Serb nationalist leader, and his army chief, Ratko Mladic, who are now sought by the UN War Crimes Tribunal.

In February 1994, a Serb mortar attack in Sarajevo increased western involvement, including the downing of four Serb aircraft by NATO planes as part of Operation Deny Flight. That same year, Croatia began to support Bosnia in an effort to pool resources against Serbia, creating the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States and the European Community (EC) then recognized Bosnia independence. With Croatia’s help, the Bosnian army made progress, but Serb forces counterattacked into a UN Safe Area triggering NATO planes to bomb them. Serbs responded by taking UN peacekeepers hostage, and using them as human shields. NATO initiated planning for ground operations in the summer of 1994, envisioning the use of a U.S. Southern European Task Force (SETAF)-led force to recover UN forces. As operational-level planning continued, diplomatic efforts intensified.

In tandem with NATO’s planning efforts, the United States and its allies debated on whether to intervene. Condemnation within both the United States and abroad was plentiful with some critics calling intervention another Vietnam or Lebanon.¹⁰⁶ It appeared that political

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Country Background Notes: Bosnia, August 1999.

¹⁰⁶ Caspar Weinberger, “Getting Our Troops into the Trenches by Christmas,” *Forbes*, December 18, 1995, Vol. 156, Issue 14, 33. Weinberger’s primary criticism was that the Dayton agreement was not going to be kept by all the warring parties. According to him, the agreement was too complex and gave the Serbs exactly what they wanted—“two Bosnias.” In addition, he highlighted the danger of two key individuals: Karadzic and Mladic, both of whom had the potential to either thwart IFOR’s efforts or simply wait until the scheduled one year U.S. pullout to reinstate their activities. Weinberger wrote a series of critical articles. See also, “Bosnia—An American and World Tragedy,” *Forbes*, July 7, 1995, Volume 156, Issue 1, 33 and “Somalia-Clinton’s Lebanon; and Bosnia,” *Forbes*, September 13, 1993, Volume 152, Issue 6, 35.

leadership had difficulty determining if national interests were at stake, and the military leadership feared a quagmire. However, political factions became galvanized when the Serbs massacred thousands of Muslims, July 1995, in the UN designated “safe areas” of Srebrenica and Zepa.

From the date of the massacres until the offering of the Bosnian peace plan, Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), in mid September, intense diplomatic efforts continued. U.S. policymakers entered the conflict, but without a clear understanding of how it affected U.S. interests.¹⁰⁷ Signed 14 December 1995 by the warring factions (Serbs, Croats, and Muslims), the (DPA) ended the Balkan crisis.

Under the DPA, UN Security Council Resolution 1031 mandated NATO to oversee and enforce the cease-fire. That force, known as the Implementation Force (IFOR), part of Operation Joint Endeavor, deployed to implement the cease-fire on 20 December 1995. IFOR was a 60,000-person, thirty-six nation coalition force, including eighteen thousand U.S. troops.¹⁰⁸ The Clinton Administration originally pledged to Congress that U.S. participation would last no longer than one year.¹⁰⁹ One year later, December 20, 1996, it was determined that the deadline was not reasonable, and it was extended to early 1997.¹¹⁰ It was apparent that conditions for peace were not yet established and hostilities would only resume once IFOR left. As a result, NATO leadership decided a smaller force of approximately 7,500 known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) would assume the mission.

Referred to as Operation Joint Guard, SFOR received an eighteen-month extension. Like IFOR, SFOR operates under Chapter VII (Peace Enforcement) of the UN Charter. In June of 1998, Operation Joint Guard transitioned to a smaller force, and was renamed Operation Joint

¹⁰⁷ Steven L Burg and Paul S. Shoup. *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 410.

¹⁰⁸ Larry Wentz, 3.

¹⁰⁹ House National Security Committee. “National Security Report: U.S. Troops in Bosnia: Caught in the Quagmire?” Volume 1, Issue 1. (Washington, D.C., 1 January 1997), 2.

Forge. Operation Joint Forge, still ongoing, is committed without an end state. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) approved a plan that identifies both active and reserve forces tasked to conduct operations in Bosnia and Kosovo through May 2005, SFOR 16 and KFOR 6B. The intent of the rotation plan is to provide predictability and stability to servicemen.¹¹¹ Soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division become SFOR XI, April 2002.

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

U.S. strategic interests in the region centered on a commitment to Europe, NATO, and a fear of Balkan violence proliferating. During this period, NATO was attempting to define itself in the post-Cold War. This was NATO's first-ever ground operation, and its first "out of area" operation.¹¹² Strategic guidance for NATO came in the form of the DPA, Annexes 1A and 1B, and the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), which authorized IFOR.¹¹³

Unfortunately, IFOR's end state was not defined by measurable objectives, but reflected NATO's time driven end state. As outlined in a 1998 U.S. General Accounting Office report to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, "The Dayton Agreement provided little guidance about what would constitute a desired end state for NATO operations in Bosnia. The agreement sought to establish lasting security based on a durable cessation of hostilities but did not further define these terms."¹¹⁴ The commander of U.S. Forces in Europe and NATO's

¹¹⁰ Johnson, William T. *U.S. Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, Not a Sprint*, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 1.

¹¹¹ "Army Sets 5-year Balkans Rotation," Army News Service, [database online] (December 4, 2000, accessed February 2, 2002); available from www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Dec2000/a20001204rotate01.html. There is no indication that the war on terrorism affects this rotation plan.

¹¹² Larry Wentz, 3.

¹¹³ www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree, [database online] (accessed 12 December 2001). Under the Dayton Peace Accord, the GFAP principle tasks were: establishment of a durable cessation of hostilities, establishment of legal authorization for IFOR to take required actions to ensure compliance with the agreement and the force's own protection; and the establishment of lasting security and arms control measures which aimed to promote permanent reconciliation and facilitate achievement of all political arrangements agreed to in the GFAP.

¹¹⁴ U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, "Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force," (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, October 1998), 42.

Supreme Commander echoed this sentiment when he stated in September 1996 that the politicians had yet to give him clear and unambiguous directions on what they expected troops to accomplish in Bosnia after the mandate was scheduled to end, 20 December 1996.¹¹⁵

It was not until the deployment of SFOR that NATO defined an end state. At that time, NATO defined the end state as an environment sufficiently secure for the “continued consolidation of the peace” without supervision by a military force.¹¹⁶ Although NATO’s relevance and cessation of violence were relatively obvious strategic interests, strategic guidance and the subsequent operational framework was far more ambiguous.

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

As far back as 1992, USAREUR began planning for possible operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in preparation for the possible NATO extraction of UNPROFOR personnel. In 1995, planning shifted to Operation Joint Endeavor and for the United States, the 1st Armored Division.¹¹⁷ Although initial planning did not include peacekeeping operations, it did provide a perspective on the magnitude of future mission requirements.

On August 18, 1995, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) tasked USAREUR to develop a concept for the implementation of a peacekeeping force in Bosnia. Planning centered around the size of force, area to be covered, and tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. By October 1995, USAREUR had advanced a mission statement and commander’s intent. Within the commander’s intent, the end state read, “The end state for the operation will be when the terms of

¹¹⁵ “NATO’s Top General Request Clear Goal for Bosnian Mission,” *Austin American-Statesman*, 27 September 1996, sec1A, 10. Taken from Michael D. Gilpin, “Exit Strategy: The New Dimension in Operational Planning,” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 May 1997).

¹¹⁶ U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, “Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO’s Stabilization Force,” 42. There were four conditions that must have been met to achieve this end state: political leaders of Bosnia’s three ethnic groups demonstrate commitment to resolve political and military differences by negotiations; civil structures sufficiently mature to assume responsibilities for compliance with the Dayton Agreement; adherence by the political leaders of Bosnia’s three ethnic groups to the military requirements of the Dayton Agreement; and conditions established for on-going nation-building activities. These conditions inextricably tied SFOR to the political and economic development of Bosnia.

the treaty have been enforced to standard, U.S. forces are withdrawn from sector (not later than 12 months after arrival) and U.S. forces exit with minimal battle and non-battle casualties.”¹¹⁸ Understandably, the end state mirrored the twelve-month military timeline promulgated by the United States and NATO, but did not address political or economic factors.

Presently, NATO’s specific tasks have evolved into deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace, promote a climate in which the peace process can continue to move forward, and provide selective support to civilian organizations within its capabilities.¹¹⁹ Beyond these tasks, there is no definition of mission success. It does not appear that there has been a modification to the initial SFOR end state. SFOR is committed to implement the DPA and participate as part of NATO, but with no clearly defined end state. As the situation has permitted however, U.S. troops levels have steadily decreased since their height in 1996.¹²⁰

SUMMARY

Despite emphasis on the importance of end state in campaign planning at both the strategic and operational levels, U.S. leaders appear to have not adequately defined or modified it according to changing conditions in Bosnia. The administration appears to have exhibited “repair service behavior” as defined in Chapter Three of this paper. Without a clear goal, they sought to fix the obvious problems, solutions of which may cause more problems later. Ambiguous, imprecise political discourse between the NCA and thirty-three other sovereign nations, as well as the UN and the European Union (EU) only complicated matters for the operational planners. Due

¹¹⁷ Operation Joint Endeavor USAREUR Headquarters, After Action Report, May 2000, 2-1.

¹¹⁸ Operation Joint Endeavor, USAREUR Headquarters, After Action Report, May 1997, 148-154.

¹¹⁹ “History of SFOR,” [database online] (accessed December 12, 2001); available from <http://hq.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116.htm>.

¹²⁰ U.S. European Command, [database online] (accessed December 12, 2001), available from www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Operations/main. The closest the author could determine an end state was in EUCOM’s statement, “NATO’s aim is to achieve a secure environment to ensure peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina without the presence of NATO-led military force.” However, the website clearly states there is no end state.

to this and a host of other challenges, the operational planning staff worked under a compressed timeline.¹²¹

Although military forces were required to provide a secure environment, the military was obviously the supporting effort. “Consequently, the political-diplomatic dimensions of the operation assumed greater importance and tended to dominate the planning, deployment, employment, and support phases of the operation as a whole.”¹²² Operations in Bosnia illustrate an operational commander’s difficulty in struggling with the political instrument of national power in campaign planning, specifically, development of end states. This can especially be problematic if the instruments of national power are not synchronized into a coherent campaign plan as appears was the case with U.S. operations in Bosnia.

Campaign planning for Bosnia also provides an excellent example of the challenges fraught in defining a problem in a complex system. Variables associated with history, culture, religion, and international politics were plentiful. Finally, Bosnia highlights the tension involved at the operational-level of war. If tactical success is not clearly linked to operational objectives that are tied to a strategic aim, it may be in vain.

From the tactical standpoint, operations in Bosnia have been a success. The military aspects of the DPA appear complete. “What remains to be accomplished and what is generally recognized as the more difficult goal are the civilian and humanitarian rebuilding of Bosnia.”¹²³ Highlighting the challenge of the political dimension is the fact that “two of Bosnia’s three ethnic groups, Bosnian Serbs and Croats, actively oppose Dayton and are prepared to wait until the international community withdraws and the agreement can be laid to rest.”¹²⁴ Finally, danger is

¹²¹ Operation Joint Endeavor USAREUR Headquarters, After Action Report, May 2000, 18.

¹²² Ibid, 26.

¹²³ House National Security Committee. “National Security Report: U.S. Troops in Bosnia: Caught in the Quagmire?” Volume 1, Issue 1, (Washington, D.C., 1 January 1997).

¹²⁴ James M. B. Lyon, “Will Bosnia Survive Dayton?” *Current History*, March 2000, 111. Also see “NATO’s Operations and Contingency Plans for Stabilizing the Balkans,” U.S. General Accounting Office, March 11, 1999, 3. The delays in implementing the Dayton’s civil provisions are a continuing manifestation of the attitudes of Bosnian Serbs and Croats toward a unified Bosnia. The majority of these

still present in Bosnia. Recent examples of this danger are the January 2002 arrest of six Algerian nationals suspected of links to Islamic terrorist networks, and the car bomb that damaged the Bosnian Croat government minister's home last spring.¹²⁵

According to U.S. military doctrine, a mission statement contains the task and purpose. The purpose is directly tied to the commander's vision of an end state. In the case of SFOR, there is a vague end state. "The mission will be assessed periodically and the force commitment will be adjusted as needed."¹²⁶ SFOR's purpose is now interwoven with political and economic stability, but it does not appear these instruments of national power were fully defined until long after the implementation of the military instrument. Hence, a campaign plan was absent. As Senator John McCain aptly explained, "Restating the political goals of the Dayton Accords as the President has done, and tying U.S. military presence to achieving these lagging political objectives, is not sufficient or appropriate for defining a military mission."¹²⁷ However, U.S. military forces are still deployed with no end in sight.

Further highlighting the complex morass of U.S. involvement in the Balkans, activity in another of its regions, Kosovo, was slowly beginning to rage. Milosevic's Serb-sponsored violence required NATO to respond once again.

two groups and their leaders want to establish separate states from Bosnia. Only 19 % of Bosnian Serbs and 45 % of Bosnian Croats support the goal of a Bosnia as a unified state.

¹²⁵ "Bosnia, Next Stop Cuba," BBC, [database online] (10 April 2001, accessed February 3, 2002); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1781000/1781324.stm. "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Car Bomb Damages Minister's Home," [database online] (accessed January 31, 2002); available from www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/04/10042001120942.asp.

¹²⁶ U.S. European Command, [database online] (accessed February 3, 2002); available from <http://www.eucom.mil/directorates/ecpa/operations/ojg/htm&2>.

¹²⁷ John McCain, "Getting Our Troops Out of Bosnia," *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 98, Vol. 21, 5. In this editorial, Senator McCain denounces Clinton's lack of an exit strategy and the European allies' refusal to take on a greater responsibility for the area.

CHAPTER FIVE: KOSOVO

“This is almost a surrealistic situation. It’s not possible to separate them, because they live in high-rises, apartments next to each other. As long as those people are not willing to live peacefully together, it’s not my fault.”¹²⁸

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze U.S. military operations in Kosovo by building on the Balkan background described in the previous chapter, detailing the specifics of Kosovo, and examining how the operation was defined through strategic guidance and operational planning. Finally, it will determine the degree of end state development, and its effectiveness.

BACKGROUND

Located in the southwestern part of Serbia, Kosovo, like Bosnia, is a complex problem, involving a fusion of history, culture, and people’s passions. The “Maryland-size province” has a population of approximately two million.¹²⁹ The Serbs consider Kosovo their homeland, but approximately ninety percent of the population is ethnic Albanian. The history of Kosovo is fraught with tension over territorial claims from both the Serbs and the Albanians, tracing as far back as the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The region began to flare up recently however, under the management of a well known character who gained his notoriety from the Bosnian conflict, Slobadon Milosevic.

In 1989, Milosevic stoked ethnic hatred by publicly declaring the Kosovar majority was oppressing the Serbs. He amended the Serb constitution to abolish Kosovo’s status as an autonomous province, increasing Serb security forces in the region.¹³⁰ In 1998, Milosevic conducted a military campaign against separatists inside Kosovo.

¹²⁸ Gen. Klaus Reinhardt, interviewed by CNN.com, 17 Mar 00; accessed November 10, 2001.

¹²⁹ Laura Rozen, “Beginner’s Guide to the Balkans,” [database online] (March 31, 1999, accessed February 3, 2002); available from www.salon.com/news/1999/03/31newsa. An accurate population estimate is difficult because of the movement of refugees and ethnic cleansing.

¹³⁰ www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/Kosovo1, [database online] (accessed December 12, 2001).

NATO denounced the continued use of violence. It decided to impel a peaceful resolution and to promote stability in neighboring countries such as Macedonia and Albania. NATO preparation included the refinement of contingency plans and the staging of exercises near the border to demonstrate resolve. The exercises fell under the category of Partnerships for Peace (PfP), meant to enhance the public image of both Albania and Macedonia.¹³¹ Numerous attempts for a diplomatic resolution failed. By September 1998, a peaceful resolution appeared remote so NATO issued an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) for planning and execution of limited air operations.¹³² All the while, the media broadcasted the atrocities daily rousing western empathy.

A peace agreement, negotiated at a conference in Rambouillet, France, and orchestrated by the primary NATO countries, intended to resolve the conflict in March 1999. Milosevic refused to cooperate.

Because of Milovic's refusal, from March through June 1999, NATO conducted a bombing campaign called Operation Allied Force against the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The purpose was to stop Muslim atrocities and "encourage" Serbia to the bargaining table. The Air Forces of thirteen NATO countries participated until the bombing suspension in June 1999. U.S. military forces also deployed to Albania and Macedonia to conduct humanitarian relief operations for the Kosovar refugees. In addition, a U.S. army combat task force deployed to Albania to provide additional support for the air campaign.¹³³ Known as Task Force Hawk, this force would form the bulk of the U.S. peacekeeping effort.

For unknown reasons, President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and allow the UN peacekeeping force entry into the region. UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999, authorized the deployment of a NATO-led international force.

¹³¹ www.kosovo.mod.uk/natokosovo, [database online] (accessed December 12, 2001). The site details NATO activities from May 1998 up to the commitment of ground troops, 20 June 1999. Of note, Operation Determined Falcon staged mock airstrikes in neighboring Albania and Macedonia.

¹³² Ibid.

On 20 June 1999, NATO deployed ground troops into Kosovo. The force operates in conjunction with a civilian interim UN administration which oversees reconstruction.¹³⁴ Unlike Bosnia, where the international community had almost four years of experience governing it as a de facto protectorate, Kosovo proved turbulent, and the UN was not prepared to take over civilian management.¹³⁵

Both the air campaign and subsequent ground operation were shrouded in criticism, both at home and abroad, complicating already strenuous U.S. relations with Russia and China.¹³⁶ Even from the western perspective, the air and ground operations were controversial, and critics were found on both sides of an issue that appeared confusing at times. In addition, the air campaign demonstrated a technology rift between the United States and its NATO allies, reinforced the criticism of American casualty aversion, and the western trend of violating state sovereignty. Despite criticism and unintended secondary effects, NATO leaders decided to intervene on behalf of humanitarian and strategic interests.¹³⁷

¹³³ William J. Clinton, Text of Letter to Congress on Kosovo, Nando Media, U.S. Newswire, [database online] (April 7, 1999, accessed December 27, 2001); available from <http://archive.nandotimes.com/Kosovo/story/general/0.2773.35796-57676-421645-0-nandotimes.00>.

¹³⁴ Steven Metz, 6.

¹³⁵ Lenard J. Cohen, "Kosovo: Nobody's Country," *Current History*, March 2000, 117.

¹³⁶ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and the Kosovo Conflict," SSI, May 2000, 2. Operations in Kosovo sent unintended messages around the world. For example, the People's Republic of China (PRC) interpreted it as a precedent for aggression within the territory of a sovereign state simply justified on humanitarian grounds. This was especially pertinent to China because of their human rights issues and Taiwan. In Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne's article, "A New Grand Strategy," in *The Atlantic Monthly*, January 2002, they also highlight this precedent on page 38. U.S. efforts in Kosovo prompted an "anti-U.S. constellation of China, Russia, and India." According to them, this constellation "viewed the Kosovo war as a dangerous precedent establishing Washington's self-declared right to interfere in other countries' internal affairs."

¹³⁷ In Michael Mandelbaum's article, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War Against Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1999. He argues that NATO operations in Kosovo were an unintended consequence of a gross error in political judgment, and failed to accomplish the objectives it laid out. For example, the people emerged from the war worse off than before the intervention. In addition, Alan Stephens, "Kosovo or the Future of War," Working Paper No. 54 (Canberra Australia: Australian Defense Academy, 1999), 1-22, suggested indicators that the Serbian military and police force units murdered as many as 10,000 Kosovar Albanians during Operation Allied Force.

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

The United States and NATO decided to conduct operations in Kosovo based on three key strategic interests. First, the conflict threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of NATO's southeastern region. Second, Serb treatment of ethnic Albanians created a humanitarian crisis. Third, Milosevic directly challenged the credibility of NATO.¹³⁸ Despite these aims, throughout the air war over Kosovo there was much anxiety within the United States as to what the Clinton administration was trying to achieve. The Clinton administration appeared reluctant to become involved in another Balkan conflict. Highlighting this tension was the passing of the Snowe-Cleland Amendment that requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report detailing a contingency operation to Congress along with any request for appropriations. Next, the Robert's Amendment was passed. It forbade spending money for intervention unless prerequisites and reporting requirements were completed.¹³⁹

It has been over two years since NATO ended the air war and commenced peace operations in Kosovo. Kosovo is officially a UN protectorate and unofficially a NATO trusteeship, where arson, slayings, and grenade attacks serve as a daily reminder that peace is not the uppermost priority of everyone in the region. The future is as unsure as at any time since the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.¹⁴⁰ Possibly demonstrating his lesson in Bosnia, President Clinton told Congress it was not feasible to predict how long the Kosovo operation would last. According to him, his objective was to transfer responsibilities to other organizations and to

¹³⁸ William S. Cohen and GEN Henry H. Shelton, "Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review," (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1999), [database online] (October 1999, accessed December 27, 2001); available from www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/joint_endeavor.

¹³⁹ U.S. Senate, "Cleland Asks Administration to Comply with Law Requiring Detailed Report on Objectives and Exit Strategy in Kosovo," (Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., April 21, 1999). The Snowe-Cleland amendment is required when deployment involves a force of more than 500. It specifically requires 1) clear and distinct objectives and 2) "what the President has identified on the basis of those objectives as the date, or set of conditions, that defines the endpoint of the operation." Despite the request of Senator Cleland for this information, the six billion dollar emergency appropriations request for Kosovo was approved. The Robert's Amendment was highlighted in Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 439-440.

¹⁴⁰ Carl C. Hodge, "Woodrow Wilson in Our Time: NATO's Goals in Kosovo." *Parameters*, (Carlisle: PA: U.S. Army War College, Spring 2001), 3.

redeploy U.S. forces as soon as the situation allowed.¹⁴¹ Like Bosnia, the Kosovo conflict symbolizes the challenges facing an operational commander and the application of military power in a peace operation environment.

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

KFOR is the 37,000-man, NATO-led contingent deployed to the region to monitor both the MTA. There are twenty-nine maneuver battalions, including 5,300 American troops.¹⁴² KFOR is divided into five sectors of responsibility: British, French, Italian, German, and US. It is commanded by a three star general headquartered in Pristina. The United States is responsible for the southeastern portion with all forces under command and control of Task Force Falcon.

KFOR missions include:

Monitor, verify, and enforce as necessary the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) in order to secure a safe environment; provide humanitarian assistance in support of the UNHCR efforts; initially enforce basic law and order, transitioning this function to the designated civilian agency as soon as possible; and establish and support the resumption of core civil functions.¹⁴³

Despite military efforts, the civil aspects such as transition to a viable civilian government are moving slowly. Crime and terrorist acts, although less than before KFOR deployment, are still running rampant.¹⁴⁴ The February 2001 bus bombing, attack on a KFOR-led convoy, five hundred-person riot, and the January 2002 crack down on human trafficking are just a few examples.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ William J. Clinton, Text of Letter to Congress on Kosovo, April 7, 1999, Nando Media, U.S. Newswire, [database online] (April 7, 1999, accessed December 27, 2001); available from <http://archive.nandotimes.com/Kosovo/story/general/0.2773.35796-57676-421645-0-nandotimes.00>.

¹⁴² Steven Metz, 6.

¹⁴³ www.tffalcon.hqusa.army.mil [database online] (accessed February 3, 2002).

¹⁴⁴ Steven Metz, 25.

¹⁴⁵ Army News Service, "KFOR Responds to Surge of Violence," [database online] (February 21, 2001, accessed January 15, 2002); available from www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Feb2001/a20010221kosovo21. Also, "Serbian Police Swoop on Vice Bars," BBC, [database online] (January 25, 2002, accessed February 3, 2002); available from www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1781000/1781324.stm. According to the article, the presence of 50,000 international peacekeepers in Kosovo and Bosnia has increased demand for prostitution.

Initially, U.S. military planning in Kosovo focused on the air war, then shifted to ground operations. Among senior U.S. Army leaders, there was less concern about defeating the Serbs, and more concern about becoming an occupation force.¹⁴⁶ According to the GEN (ret) Wesley Clark, then U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Commander in Chief (CINC), there was no detailed planning for Kosovo or strategic consensus.¹⁴⁷ Operations in Kosovo did not fall into the JOPES deliberate planning cycle, but fell under Crisis Action Planning (CAP). In addition, U.S. military planners could not plan early because consensus was needed among the coalition before the countries would participate. U.S. military planners simply could not plan in a vacuum without NATO allies, and under the constraints of the Robert's Amendment, detailed planning was restricted. For example, NATO planners were not allowed to be present at the Rambouillet Accords due to either a fear of offending Russia by discussing the military annex too early or of introducing the military dimension prematurely.¹⁴⁸

Regardless of the reason and unlike the Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia, military planners were not able to conduct detailed planning until after the peace talks. Further complicating the operational planning process, and dissimilar to IFOR's deployment into Bosnia, Kosovo was seething with violence during the initial stages of KFOR deployment. "The international community was overwhelmed by the turbulence and ethnic violence in Kosovo during the summer of 1999."¹⁴⁹ However, operational planning for Kosovo was similar to Bosnia in that initially the military was the predominant mechanism. The other instruments of national power such as economic were an afterthought, and not tied to a campaign plan and its end state.

As mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, determination of the desired end state is a critical component of campaign planning. Expediency has no place in the equation. Shortsighted solutions that play well with the media or pander to preconceived notions of public support

¹⁴⁶ George C. Wilson, "Exit Strategy a Must for Army Invasion Endorsement," *Army Times*, May 10, 1999, Vol. 59, Issue 41, 16.

¹⁴⁷ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 439.

¹⁴⁸ Wesley K. Clark, 445.

generate long-term problems that become yet more difficult to solve.¹⁵⁰ According to some critics of Kosovo, the air war continued as U.S. officials avoided defining a clear strategy to end the campaign.¹⁵¹ As noted in a July 2001, U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress on the Kosovo air operation, the absence of an end state and clearly defined objectives was a significant departure from U.S. doctrine.¹⁵² As for the ground operation, it does not appear planners were able to focus on an end state. Rather, planning seemed to focus on the ways and means necessary to conduct the operation.

Currently, KFOR is an open commitment. “The mission will be assessed periodically and the force commitment will be adjusted as needed.”¹⁵³ Like SFOR, KFOR is fundamentally tied to the civil aspects of economic development and nation building. This point is highlighted by the words of Joseph Biden, Senator on the Committee on Foreign Relations, when he described KFOR as the “indispensable factor” in creating the conditions for a free-market democracy.¹⁵⁴

SUMMARY

Is Kosovo destined to end up like the U.S. supported UN mission in the Sinai with no end in sight? Conceived in the 1979 Camp David Accord negotiations and thirty-nine rotations of U.S. infantry battalions later, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) supervise the treaty between Israel and Egypt.¹⁵⁵ As long as a military withdrawal is tied to economic recovery in the

¹⁴⁹ Lenard J. Cohen, “Kosovo: Nobody’s Country,” *Current History*, March 2000, 119.

¹⁵⁰ Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., “From Chancellorsville to Kosovo, Forgetting the Art of War,” *Parameters*, (Carlisle: PA: U.S. Army War College, Summer 00), 5.

¹⁵¹ Thomas Valasek, “The End Game in Yugoslavia,” *The Center for Defense Information*; Volume 3, Issue #14, April 8, 1999.

¹⁵² U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Congressional Requesters, “Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures,” (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, October 1998/July 2001), 6. The report found that there were seven doctrinal departures, all of which largely resulted from the “NATO alliance’s desire to maintain alliance cohesion.”

¹⁵³ www.eucom.mil/directorates/ecpa/operations/ojg.htm&2, [database online] (accessed February 3, 2002).

¹⁵⁴ Joseph R. Biden, Jr., A Report to the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, [database online] (February 2001, accessed 27 December, 2001); available from http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:70112.wais.

¹⁵⁵ Thomas Spoehr, “This Shoe No Longer Fits,” *Parameters*, Autumn 2000, page 109-125.

region, it appears U.S. forces may remain indefinitely. “For the foreseeable future, Kosovo will remain an international protectorate, while outsiders must hold the ring in Macedonia.”¹⁵⁶

Incidentally, the United States also provides the battalion-size force in Macedonia. Creating a self-reliant Kosovo devoid of violence is a long-term commitment.

NATO reviews operations in Kosovo at six-month intervals. The reviews support an assessment of force levels, force structure, force reduction, future requirements, and the “eventual withdrawal of KFOR.”¹⁵⁷ The environment in Kosovo however, has not allowed a reduction in force or warranted discussion of KFOR’s withdrawal.

U.S. planners identified early the emphasis that politics would play. It is unrealistic however, to assume they could have recognized KFOR’s difficulty transitioning responsibility to civilian authorities, especially given the partisan debates within the United States and national interests of each participating country. Finally, some feel it is implausible that U.S. planners could have imagined the degree to which U.S. forces would be “acting as social workers and performing other civic duties, with no end in sight.”¹⁵⁸ However, the lessons learned from Bosnia and the fact that EUCOM planned both operations seems to dispute this assumption. As in U.S. operations in Bosnia, a synchronized campaign plan was absent for Kosovo

¹⁵⁶ “Kosovo and Macedonia: Better or Worse,” *The Economist*, November 17, 2001, 50.

¹⁵⁷ George W. Bush, Text of Letter to Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, May 18, 2001, www.usembassy.org.uk/kos115, accessed December 27 2001. Despite the rhetoric concerning military readiness and foreign entanglements during the 2001 U.S. Presidential elections, President Bush maintains a U.S. commitment to the Balkans.

¹⁵⁸ John C. Hulsman, “Myth About America’s Commitment In Kosovo,” (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, August 24, 2000), 1, [database online] (August 24, 2000, accessed February 3, 2002); available from www.heritage.org.

CHAPTER SIX: RECOMMENDATIONS

“Hope is not a method.”¹⁵⁹

The purpose of this chapter is to provide recommendations relating to the complex environment of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Based primarily on the two case studies highlighted in this paper, Bosnia and Kosovo, absolutes cannot be deduced concerning the commitment of U.S. military forces, peace operations, and the role of end state. However, beginning as small-scale contingencies, a subcomponent of stability operations, and culminating as peace operations, Bosnia and Kosovo offered unique challenges. Both illustrate useful insights on strategy, doctrine, operational planning, civil-military relationship, and force planning and readiness.

STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy (NSS) describes U.S. vital interests as those involving “survival, safety, and vitality of our nation.”¹⁶⁰ This is an adequate start point in defining priorities for the commitment of U.S. forces. Peace operations do not generally fall within the first two categories of national interests, vital and important, but make up the third category, “humanitarian and other interests.”¹⁶¹ Regardless of the category, they play an important role in national strategy.

Whether in pursuit of national interests or morality, peace operations must be responsive and swift, not entanglements that commit already stretched forces. The failure to establish a strategy without clear criteria for commitment of U.S. forces inevitably leads to an unintended expenditure of precious resources that may be better spent elsewhere. No “military intervention

¹⁵⁹ Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, *Hope is not a Method*, (New York: Broadway Books, 1996).

¹⁶⁰ William J. Clinton, The White House. “A National Security Strategy for a New Century.” Washington: 1999, 1.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, 2.

should be implemented without a sober assessment of its unintended consequences. Recent interventions-whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor-have been motivated by the impulse to provide humanitarian aid to a party visibly suffering in an internal conflict.”¹⁶² Put another way, the U.S. needs “to get a better handle on what they are and are not willing to try to accomplish before commissioning any more Operation Restore Hopes.”¹⁶³

U.S. strategic leaders should abide by the same construct of planning used by operational and tactical planners that requires beginning with a clear goal in mind. Without this, it seems confusion inevitably reverberates down from the strategic to operational and tactical levels of war. Political leaders may deem a goal or end state such as “establish a long-term commitment to develop a free-market democracy” necessary and appropriate. It is certainly not the responsibility of the military to question the NCA’s aim only to pursue clarification, and accomplish the mission. By establishing actual intentions early however, operational planners can better prepare a campaign plan because they are not hampered by unrealistic expectations of assumed short-term commitments and anticipated resources.

A failure to clearly prioritize also directly affects U.S. military funding. For example, the U.S. Army used Operation and Maintenance (O & M) funds to pay for operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Because of this, planned training was cancelled and necessary infrastructure maintenance such as housing was put on hold.¹⁶⁴ If the U.S. military is going to continue

¹⁶² Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, June 2001), 110.

¹⁶³ Donald M. Snow, 125. On December 3, 1992, UN Security Resolution 794 authorized the U.S. led intervention into Somalia in order to secure an environment for humanitarian relief operations. Operation Restore Hope fell under the unified command of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). It demonstrated problems experienced due to incomplete or ineffective analysis. The operation had no long-term aim. For more information of the operation, see www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/restore_hope; accessed February 14, 2002.

¹⁶⁴ Joe Burtas, “2003 budget supports Army vision,” Army News Service, February 7, 2002. The U.S. Army’s 2003 budget will be the first time funding has been allocated for operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. “A 20-percent increase in the Army’s Operation and Maintenance account over last year includes funding for ongoing operations in Bosnia and Kosovo for the first time. In the past, each service paid for contingency operations by delaying or moving funds around for other O & M programs until Congress approved a supplemental budget later in the given fiscal year.” Although individual service management of O & M funds for the purpose of peace operations is not specifically mentioned in GAO Testimony

intervening in world crises regardless of the strategy, Congress and the White House will have to routinely create accounts in the defense budget for these operations.¹⁶⁵ A disciplined methodology for the application of U.S. military power in peace operations and its funding must be established and followed.

Finally, and no less disturbing, an ambiguous national security strategy potentially has unintended consequences such as the perception of U.S. casualty aversion in military interventions. It has been reported that when General Wesley Clark visited Belgrade in early 1999 to discuss Kosovo, his delegation was told by Serbian commanders that all the Yugoslav army needed to remember when facing the U.S. military was the number eighteen. The Serbs were referring to the eighteen soldiers killed in Somalia in 1993 that triggered U.S. withdrawal.¹⁶⁶ This is one example that demonstrates the need of a clear strategy. Without a strategy that defines U.S. interests, indecision and ambiguous guidance create a perception of political wavering and casualty aversion. This affects the credibility of the United States. For example, one of the concerns highlighted in a November 1999 Congressional Research Service report was that future adversaries might study the tactical successes Milosevic gained because NATO adopted tactics emphasizing casualty avoidance.¹⁶⁷ Although not dealing with the Balkans, another example comes from the United Kingdom, a strong U.S. ally. In reference to the no-fly zone coalition over Iraq, a House of Commons report stated, “risk aversion is assessed to be

“Defense Budget: Visibility and Accountability of O & M Fund Movements,” (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, February 29, 2000), it does address DOD’s management of these type funds. “DODs financial management regulation does not define these adjustments (internal movement of O & M funds) and provides no guidance on when it is appropriate to make such adjustments, who should approve them, or how much funding can be moved. Without any such guidance governing these movements, DOD and Congress cannot evaluate whether the movements of funds are appropriate.”

¹⁶⁵ Andrew S. Natsios, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 114.

¹⁶⁶ Gary Brown, Michael Evans, and Alan Stephens, “The Use of Military Force in Kosovo,” (Canberra Australia: Australian Defense Force Academy, August 1999), 7, [database online] (August 1999, accessed January 6, 2002); available from <http://idun.itsc.adfa.edu.au:16080/ADSC/mevans>.

¹⁶⁷ Paul E. Gallis, Coordination Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force,” (Congressional Research Service,

particularly strong in the United States.”¹⁶⁸ “If adversaries believe that fear of a handful of casualties can paralyze American statecraft, then the West risks eventual impotence.”¹⁶⁹ For the U.S. military, impotence translates to risk aversion.

Risk aversion may have a devastating affect on the military culture itself. Although this idea will not be pursued within the confines of this paper, an atmosphere of risk aversion or casualty aversion has the potential to erode the “warrior ethos” of the U.S. military. Risk aversion or casualty avoidance flies in the face of the military’s creed of selfless sacrifice. Although peace operations may require a slightly different mindset then typically maintained when conducting combat operations, the idea of “warrior ethos” is no less critical. Unit cohesion, morale, and esprit de corps are wholly interwoven into this abstract concept, and into the very effectiveness of the U.S. military.

A clear National Security Strategy and subsequent National Military Strategy are paramount. Their clarity is vital and will resonate throughout the spectrum of U.S. national power. They directly affect the conduct of stability operations through responsiveness, analysis of strategic intentions, and the ability to endure the necessary sacrifices to achieve the stated goal or end state. Finally, their clarity should provide the CINC with the tasks, purpose, and estimated duration for each potential peace operation mission.

DOCTRINE

Since the early 1990’s, U.S. military doctrine has adapted adequately by incorporating the basics of peace operations and the value of end state. The author contends that doctrine should assist operational planners define the conditions and objectives necessary to achieve an end state that is directly tied to the strategic aim. The author is not recommending prescriptive

Library of Congress, November 19, 1999), [database online] (November 19, 1999, accessed February 14, 2002); available from www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/ndu99/pellerin.

¹⁶⁸ “UK Operations Northern No-Fly Zone,” House of Commons, Defence, Thirteenth Report, [database online] (April 7, 2000, accessed February 14, 2002); available from www.fas.org/news/iraq/2000/07/45307.

doctrine that provides a methodical process. The last thing an operational planner requires is a linear campaign checklist to solve a problem in a complex system.

As demonstrated with operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, there is no fixed solution. However, as James W. Reed stated in “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” “transitioning from strategic to the operational level, one might expect to find somewhat less ethereal guidance on the incorporation of war termination considerations into campaign planning.”¹⁷⁰ The operational planner is offered little in the way of a guide. Joint doctrine imparts vague direction on how to translate national political objectives into operational terms. Simply stating “The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action. End state is described as the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives” is not sufficient.¹⁷¹ As operations in Bosnia and Kosovo clearly indicate, the NCA may not give a “clearly described end state.”

U.S. Army FM 3-0 *Operations* comes the closest to providing useful guidance for the operational commander. The manual’s description of “logical lines of operation” offers a technique that enables the operational commander to visualize, plan, and synchronize an operation. “Logical lines of operation” are the linking of multiple objectives by purpose. These objectives form a path and once achieved, set conditions for the end state. However, the example and description explained in FM 3-0 only highlights the military instrument of national power.¹⁷² As described in Chapter One of this paper, an operational campaign plan must include the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. In the case of peace operations, the military may be a shaping or supporting element, while the political or economic instruments are decisive instruments. A more practical model should include the “logical lines of operation” for each applicable instrument of national power, show how the lines are interrelated,

¹⁶⁹ Gary Brown, Michael Evans, and Alan Stephens, 7.

¹⁷⁰ James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” *Parameters*, Summer 1993, 44.

¹⁷¹ Department of Defense, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, III-2.

and detail the objectives necessary to set conditions for the end state. The author recommends that this model be implemented into both FM 3-0 and JP 3-0.

Since joint doctrine takes precedence over individual service publications, Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, should also be updated to include a section specifically devoted to developing a campaign plan, beginning with the end state. The addition should compliment Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter II, Section F, but highlight specific military conditions that may be necessary to support the end state. In addition, guidance an operational commander can consider when developing his intent may also be useful. Lastly, there should be guidance dealing with the assumption of operation duration and how to coordinate this with the NCA.

Next, the lists of fundamentals, principles, and imperatives found in current doctrine are informative, but aid little in the way of helping an operational planner develop a campaign plan. In some cases, the lists are different. A common language is needed throughout the joint and service publications. One final example concerns FM 3-0 and JP 3-0. FM 3-0 lists “Elements of Operational Design” while JP 3-0 describes “Elements of Operational Art.”

Finally, the term “exit strategy” has found its way into political and military jargon. Borrowed from the business world, the term became vogue during the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Somalia.¹⁷³ The author finds it difficult to distinguish between end state and exit strategy, and fails to see the value added. Although doctrine is only useful if continually reassessed, the author is of the mindset that adding exit strategy only complicates matters. The term also appears to send the wrong message to U.S. allies by placing exit requirements above actual mission accomplishment. The idea of a “formal exit strategy, with its anti-interventionist bias and stress on rigid public planning, is misguided in theory and unhelpful in practice. Instead

¹⁷² FM 3-0 *Operations*, 5-9.

¹⁷³ Gideon Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1998, 57.

of obsessing about the exit, planners should concentrate on the strategy.”¹⁷⁴ In his article, “Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations,” LTC Kevin Benson seems convinced of its usefulness in U.S. operations in Haiti.¹⁷⁵ In the author’s opinion, the terms end state and conflict termination in JP 3-0 and 5-0 are adequate constructs for planning.

PLANNING

As for planning, planners must thoroughly labor through situation development or mission analysis and identify the plethora of variables involved before trying to identify solutions. As evidenced by NATO air operations in Kosovo, tendencies to lean forward early in the planning process or to act before sufficiently defining the problem are deceptively expedient and may impair the final product. Emphasis must be on the backwards-planning approach to campaign development—ends, ways, and means. Every aspect of the campaign plan must be oriented on attainment of the end state, the goal. The absence of definition or detail in operational objectives may produce unintended consequences in the course of a campaign. More important, the process of defining operational objectives with a high degree of clarity should prompt increased communication between the civilian and military leadership that will help to ensure congruence between operational objectives and the larger policy aims of a campaign.”¹⁷⁶

As illustrated by U.S. operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the end state may be elusive, nonexistent, or change based on the evolving dynamics of the situation. However, it is still important to start planning with an intended goal, vision, or objective, and reassess it at regular intervals to track progress. By doing this, the ends drive the remainder of planning.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Kevin M. Benson and CPT Christopher B. Thrash; “Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations,” *Parameters*, Autumn 1996, 69-80. In addition, Colonel Michael D. Gilpin also advances the term exit strategy in his paper, “Exit Strategy: The New Dimension in Operational Planning,” (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, May 15, 1997). However, his paper draws heavily on LTC Benson’s article.

¹⁷⁶ James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” *Parameters*, Summer 1993, 7.

When devising an end state, planners must think in terms of visualizing the desired condition of friendly forces, the threat, and if possible, geography, desired at the completion of the operation. A “mission-oriented” end state tied to goals and objectives is another effective technique as long as they are clear and unambiguous. Examples that were successful because they achieved the end state and supporting objectives are the U.S. invasion of Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury, and Panama, Operation Just Cause.¹⁷⁷

An end state simply defined by a time condition has historically failed as seen with the recent example of Bosnia. First, it is unrealistic because it does not account for a changing environment and the role of uncertainty. Second, the belligerent simply awaits U.S. withdrawal and resumes pursuing their interests. “The simplistic notion of a time-bound “exit strategy” suggests that a humanitarian intervention is a mechanical task, rather than a strategic effort characterized by uncertainty and changing tactics on the ground.¹⁷⁸ Planners must attempt to discourage time only end states.

Next, planners must develop flexible plans that can adapt to a changing environment, but still adhere to the overarching strategic aim. During the initial development, planners make numerous assumptions. It is important to identify these assumptions and get clarity. Inevitably, a number of assumptions will remain, and for these, the planners must develop branch plans to address them. Based on the time available, these branch plans must be developed thoroughly. Further complicating matters, it is unlikely that the United States will act unilaterally in conducting peace operations. Planners must attempt to account for the added complexity of each

¹⁷⁷ Michael D. Gilpin, “Exit Strategy: The New Dimension in Operational Planning,” (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, May 15, 1997), 18. Although Colonel Gilpin uses the term exit strategy rather than end state, in the opinion of this author, this only causes confusion. Colonel Gilpin reviews four types of exit strategies: time oriented, mission-oriented, event-oriented, and an operational composite. In addition to recommending exit strategy is added to U.S. military doctrine, he webs it with such conditions as stable infrastructure, force protection, and adequate logistical support, 30.

¹⁷⁸ Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 196.

allied country's interests. The earlier this is done, the more likely a common set of interests can be developed and agreed upon, and the sooner a collective end state may be visualized.

Weinberger's doctrine of overwhelming force had a definite place in U.S. strategy, especially after the U.S. quagmire in Vietnam. However, it should not be used as an excuse to apply massive combat power as a standard prescription for all operations. Although a large U.S. resource base allows for a larger margin of error, military planners cannot use such a methodology. It may be more efficient to plan from the perspective of constrained resources. There may be operations where overwhelming force is required, but to prescribe this principle for all operations is flawed. A thorough situation development or mission analysis may identify the need for specialized units for a particular peace operation. The U.S. doctrine of overwhelming force ensures that all U.S. peacekeeping commitments are heavy and costly.¹⁷⁹ Ironically, the same overwhelming force increases closer scrutiny by the media and political leaders. Consider the slight comparison of operations in Kosovo with those of East Timor. Based on initial research, the relatively minor role the United States played in the East Timor intervention attracted little media coverage and no apparent political inquiry compared to the daily analysis over operations in Kosovo.

Finally, and possibly most important, planners must be able to think beyond western prejudice. "The Western model presumes respect for legal norms, the benevolent effect of enlightened self-interest in guiding social relations, and tolerance and understanding among different ethnic groups. It presumes that the multicultural ideal can be revived."¹⁸⁰ To better understand the problem, to better design a clear end state, planners must appreciate the players' culture, interests, and motivations. The next topic is the civil-military relationship.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

¹⁷⁹ Alexander Woodcock, and David Davis, 150.

¹⁸⁰ Steven L. Burg, and Paul S. Shoup, 416.

Considering the tremendous interplay of politics in peace operations, military planning conducted in a vacuum is fruitless. Interagency coordination is essential between the U.S. military and other agencies such as the State Department, and must begin early in the planning process. In reality, the application of military force is only one element of national power. For successful peace operations, diplomacy and economics must play a much larger role. The sooner there is collaboration among state agencies, the better. At the operational level, planners must develop a clear end state that considers the other agencies. The CINC must then synchronize the campaign plan and work to get the NCA's consent. Although operational commanders and planners cannot be held responsible for inconsistencies in U.S. policy, they can remove ambiguity by cooperating with key civilian agencies, developing logical lines of operations for each, and gaining NCA approval. There must be communication between the operational commander, government agencies, and the political authorities to define the aim and end state.

The need for cooperation extends well beyond the traditional relations within the government, and into nongovernmental organizations.¹⁸¹ Nongovernmental organizations (NGO) must also be included as early as possible to facilitate achieving a military end state, and the eventual transition to civilian authority. In the case of Bosnia, NATO should have defined the operation from the beginning in both civilian and military contexts.¹⁸² In most cases, civilian agencies are already on the ground and very knowledgeable.¹⁸³ Since these organizations are there before and will no doubt be there afterwards, it seems obvious to maximize cooperation with them. This would ensure "the likelihood that the NGOs will be left with the best possible

¹⁸¹ Donald M. Snow, 159.

¹⁸² Larry Wentz, 51.

¹⁸³ For an idea of the number of NGOs operating in the Balkans, see www.nato.int/kfor/links/aid_links; accessed January 26, 2002. For example, Amnesty International, CARE International, Doctors without Borders, Red Cross International, Save the Children, and World Relief International are some of the NGOs listed.

situation when the forces are withdrawn.”¹⁸⁴ Although each NGO may have its own agenda, it makes sense to develop some sort of synergy toward a common goal.

FORCE STRUCTURE AND READINESS

Essentially, the U.S. military is the same force constructed to defeat the axis powers in World War Two, although much smaller. As mentioned in Chapter One of this paper, the strategic environment has changed dramatically. Non-state actors and regional, ethnic conflict now appear predominant. Is the U.S. military force structure designed efficiently to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century? This question cannot be answered satisfactorily within the confines of this paper, however, specifically relating to the impact of peace operations and end state, the author would like to address force management concerns and potential ideas for future consideration.

Before reviewing potential ideas, it is important to address a force management concern that has been highlighted by the U.S. military’s role in recent peace operations: inadequate force strength and structure. The U.S. military is tasked to deter and if necessary, fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theaters of war. From this, the U.S. military calculates its force structure requirements. The National Military Strategy (NMS) also calls for the U.S. Army to support contingency operations. Despite this requirement, the U.S. Army did not, until recently, assess requirements for contingency operations. During the recent force planning process called Total Army Analysis 2007, the Army for the first time identified the forces necessary to support seven simultaneous contingency operations.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Donald M. Snow, 159.

¹⁸⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, “Force Structure: Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency Operations,” (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, February 2001), 3. Total Army Analysis is a biennial process the Army uses to determine the numbers and types of units it would need to support combat units in two simultaneous major theater wars and the infrastructure needed to augment and support these units. Total Army Analysis 2007 was completed late 1999. For the purpose of this report, contingency operations include show of force, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief as defined on page 7. With the exception of limited strikes and interventions, these are

In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) annually assesses the Army's plans to allocate end strength. According to a February 2001 GAO assessment (which was concurred by the U.S. Department of Defense), there is a shortfall of sixty-one U.S. Army units.¹⁸⁶ Even with National Guard and Reserve augmentation, there is still a shortfall. Although the force structure could provide the estimated 76,000 troops necessary to support the seven contingencies, sustaining them beyond six months would incur needed force rotations. With an estimated five of the seven operations lasting longer than six months, the requirement is 61,000 troops. Based on the U.S. Army troop rotation policy and admitted three to one unit requirement (61,000 troops deployed, 61,000 troops in train-up for deployment, and 61,000 recovering from deployment), the U.S. Army requires 183,000 troops to conduct the five contingency operations. GAO analysis estimates that the Army's planned force structure for 2007 does not contain enough units for sustained contingency operations.

In short, only forty percent of the U.S. Army's active force has sufficient numbers to sustain six-month rotations for the five contingency operations, and with the addition of the National Guard and Reserves, only seventy-three percent.¹⁸⁷ Finally, U.S. Army's force structure is under greater strain if the contingencies were to last longer than six months, which five of the seven have historically lasted well beyond this timeframe.

Five simultaneous contingency operations may seem like an exaggeration. However, U.S. forces are currently committed to Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Ethiopia, East Timor, the

the same type missions that fall into the U.S. Army's category of stability operations or U.S. Joint category of operations other than war.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 4. End strength is the total number of positions authorized annually by Congress. This report was the fifth in a series of reports in GAO's assessment of the Total Army Analysis 2007. "Units' do not have a set size and range from an aviation battalion to a Military Intelligence linguistic team. For a complete list see Table 4: Remaining Force Structure Shortages in Fiscal Year 2007 After Substitutions on page 22.

¹⁸⁷ U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, “Force Structure: Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency Operations,” (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, February 2001), 11, [database online] (accessed December 26, 2001); available from www.gao.gov/docdb/lite. Further complicating matters, there are restrictions on the use of the National

Sinai, ongoing counterdrug operations, and with recent operations against terrorism, possibly Afghanistan. These numbers and facts may appear trivial or unreasonable, but they have secondary affects that may have adverse affects on the U.S. Army such as the ability to recruit and retain personnel, and maintain training proficiency.

Despite these concerns, the Department of Defense maintained the force structure is sufficient, and does not require any modification.¹⁸⁸ Current U.S. military policy explains that if a major regional conflict erupted, units deployed to peace operations may have to rapidly make the transition to wartime operations. There are two problems with this assumption. First, it is not politically feasible to simply drop current responsibilities and commitments.¹⁸⁹ Secondly, as already explained in this paper, units need to undergo training to return to their combat readiness proficiency. Although it may vary based on the unit, a minimum of four months is needed for this retraining. Without this training and maintenance period, visions of Task Force Smith's demise in the opening days of the Korean War come to mind. Further complicating this issue is the U.S. Army's solution to deal with personnel shortages.

U.S. Army officials claim cross-leveling individuals with the necessary Military Occupational Skill (MOS) from nondeploying units or by using contractors could address the personnel shortfall. The U.S. Army uses an ad hoc method of bringing units to readiness for peace operation deployments by borrowing personnel and small units from nondeployed units.

Guard and Reserves during peacetime such as reserve units unable to deploy for more than 270 days without the politically unfavorable Presidential Selected Reserve Call Up.

¹⁸⁸ "Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation," December 1999, [database online] (December 1999, accessed 27 December 2001); www.fas.org/man/congress/1999/cbo-pko/cbo-pko-4.

¹⁸⁹ According to U.S. General Accounting Office, "Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well Established," (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, May 2001), 5, the U.S. Army assumes that all forces with the exception of two treaty obligations (1979 Middle East Peace Treaty and Article V of the NATO Treaty, 1949) will be re-deployed to conduct warfighting. In the U.S. General Accounting Office, "Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy," (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 1999), 9. The U.S. Army did not know how many additional support forces it would need to extract forces from a contingency operation and redeploy them to a major theater of war or how such a redeployment would affect war-fighting timelines."

There is one problem with this solution. Nondeploying units are then short personnel, which adversely affects their training, unit readiness, unit cohesion, and family stability.

Given the analysis, strategic environment, and recent history of peace operations, the concern appears legitimate. One example that highlights the strain is U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and their Balkan missions. In order to relieve USAREUR's high operating and personnel tempo and allow it to focus on wartime training, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) assumed the Bosnia mission in 1998 and 1999.¹⁹⁰ Further highlighting the strain, out of ten U.S. Army divisions, all but three "are either committed to certain parts of the world or are preparing for or recovering from operations."¹⁹¹

Given the force management issue, there are possible recommendations that may alleviate the challenge of conducting peace operations. First, the U.S. Army could modify end strength in areas of critical shortage such as military police, intelligence, transportation, and medical.¹⁹² The Congressional Budget Office has supported a second option. Create four brigades specifically designed to fulfill peace operations and three standing headquarters to provide command and control.¹⁹³ This proposal expands the Army's ability to support peace operations by improving readiness and decreasing the current reliance on the reserves. A third option is to trim unnecessary forces and add the resources to areas already spread too thin such as military police, intelligence, and light infantry.

¹⁹⁰ U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, "Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but a Few Challenges Emerging," (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, April 1998), 6, 7.

¹⁹¹ U.S. General Accounting Office, "NATO's Operations and Contingency Plans for Stabilizing the Balkans," (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 11, 1999), 11.

¹⁹² General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, "Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but a Few Challenges Emerging," 13. For a detailed breakdown see also, Table 2: Forces Most Heavily Used for Contingency Operations, 20, and Table 3: Force Structure Requirements for Seven Contingencies by Branch, 21.

¹⁹³ "Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation," [database online] (December 1999 accessed 27 December 2001); available from www.fas.org/man/congress/1999/cbo-pko/cbo-pko-4. The paper, actually proposes four options. The

Modifying current force structure is obviously objectionable, but appears necessary. This challenge is not new, and has amplified since the demise of the Cold War. The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, reverberates the need for the U.S. military to streamline and adapt to the new environment. "Today's force possess a huge reservoir of motivation and dedication, and it is not yet the hollow force of the mid-1970s, but it is a force under tremendous pressure."¹⁹⁴ Force structure modifications may help relieve some of the pressure. U.S. military readiness and efficiency will benefit U.S. national security; parochialism, job protection and conventional views will not.

The potential shortfall should be of great concern. Analysis shows that the U.S. Army would need every active deployable unit, and all of its reserve support units to fight the two MTWs.¹⁹⁵ Finally, the perception outside the United States is that the U.S. military, as demonstrated in its planning processes, exercises, and ongoing doctrinal debate over the shape of the force, maintains a reservation towards stability operations.¹⁹⁶ It is time to set this apparent reservation aside and make necessary adaptations to the 21st Century.

SUMMARY

Given U.S. global responsibilities, these recommendations will not alleviate the complexities in peace operations, but may reduce confusion and facilitate discussion over their impact on readiness. Each problem inherently brings its own challenges, but it is the author's

remaining three are: 1) Cycle the readiness of some active units; 2) Reorganize existing active army forces for peace operations; and 3) Convert some combat units in the active army to supported units.

¹⁹⁴ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), American Military Culture in the Twenty-first Century, A Report of the CSIC International Security Program, February 2000, 34.

¹⁹⁵ "How Do Peace Operations Affect Readiness for Conventional War?" [database online] (accessed January 7, 2002); available from www.fas.org/man/congress/1999/cbo-pko. Other concerns include: ability to pay for peace operations, maintaining conventional warfighting skills, maintaining equipment readiness, and managing personnel readiness

¹⁹⁶ Walter Clarke and Arthur Dewey, Humanitarian and Peace Operation Coalition Building using the Comprehensive Campaign Plan," *Analysis for Peace Operations*, (Clementsport, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press of The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Training Centre, 1998), 137.

belief that by incorporating these recommendations, lessons may be truly learned from previous peace operations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

“Nothing changes so quickly as yesterday’s vision of the future.”¹⁹⁷

CONCLUSION

This paper is not an attempt to predict the future. The strategic environment is too tremendously complex for guesswork. However, the trend appears that the environment is becoming more problematic. The United States, seen as the author of globalization and the catalyst for erosion of traditional beliefs, has a multitude of antagonists. There is sufficient evidence to advocate that challenges to the United States in the twenty-first century will necessitate a strong and versatile military force, prepared to respond to an increasing variety of missions from nuclear deterrence to peace operations.¹⁹⁸ Because of this environment, peacekeeping and peace enforcement commitments will not go away, nor should they. Stability operations have been integral to the history of the United States. They are not new, and the historical trend appears to demonstrate their proliferation. The author contends engagement and intervention such as stability operations play a vital role in U.S. foreign policy. Despite this, military readiness must remain a high priority. There is no place for compromise.

Given this complex environment, planning without a start point, a goal or end state, is futile. When developing campaign plans, operational commanders cannot lose sight of the importance of an end state. Political leaders must thoroughly think through the commitment of troops. They should understand the risks associated with potential operations. Although the United States is an economically prosperous country, resources and influence are not unlimited, especially given the current threat environment. As it was with the Roman and Ottoman Empires,

¹⁹⁷ Richard Corliss, editor *Time Magazine*; taken from a briefing given by GEN (ret.) Pat Hughes to School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) students taking elective, Leading Change, January 15, 2002.

¹⁹⁸ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), American Military Culture in the Twenty-first Century, A Report of the CSIC International Security Program, February 2000, 4.

U.S. hegemony is not an eternal given.¹⁹⁹ The days of vague end state and the western planning philosophy of “we’ll get it right in time” must disappear.

The purpose of this paper was to answer the question, “is the operational construct end state relevant in planning stability operations?” In short, the answer is yes. Like most theories that are relatively clear on paper however, the concept of end state must conform to reality. While a relevant goal to strive for, and mindless to plan without, a clear end state that envisions an entire problem may be elusive early in planning. Since few have clarity of vision that can foresee an entire operation in detail, the operational commander must set intermediate goals, then continually assesses the end state, and modify it as necessary, in conjunction with the political leaders.

Even though peacekeeping operations are highly political, they should still make operational sense. If not, military forces should not be deployed.²⁰⁰ Defining an end state in peace operations is especially difficult. Vague political goals seem to defy translation into specific, obtainable military objectives.²⁰¹ U.S. doctrine states the necessity of end state in planning, but recent operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo indicate its elusiveness.

The case studies reviewed in this paper clearly demonstrate the difficulty of developing an unambiguous end state. Claiming that U.S. forces are still immersed deep in the Balkans because of a single factor, lack of a clear end state, is unrealistic. There are far too many other variables. This paper simply scratches the surface. It was not the author’s intention to fault political and military decision-makers. However, both case studies reveal there was not a campaign plan that integrated the instruments of national power. In both cases, the military instrument was the primary tool, implemented without a clear vision on an end state. It appears the other instruments of national power were simply added after the fact. The term end state has

¹⁹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, 301.

²⁰⁰ Pirnie, Bruce R. and William E. Simons. 3.

meaning and relevance, but it must be part of a campaign plan. By avoiding this complicated process, the operational planner has not completely defined the problem. Although this expedience may satisfy leaders in the short term, long-term results will eventually overshadow early gains. While unrealistic to assume an end state will solve all of a planner's problems, planning without one only confuses matters.

Further complicating matters, it seems the inter-war period beginning in 1989 with the end of the Cold War, is over. Terrorism, a century-old ailment, has found its way to American shores. With the exception of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, terrorist acts against Americans were committed in distant lands. Now, the continental United States is not isolated from the perils abroad. The military no longer has the benefit of a security environment allowing it to be over-committed throughout the globe.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 highlight the importance of a trained and ready military prepared to protect the American way of life within both the United States and abroad. As Robert Kaplan stated in his recent book, *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos*, "Wilsonian morality is attractive only so long as Americans think they are invulnerable."²⁰² The sense of invulnerability appears to be gone. Whether intervention stems from "Wilsonian morality" or vital interests, the difference appears to be academic. More important, the United States must stay engaged throughout the globe to fight terrorism, protect western freedoms, and promote globalization. In short, remain a superpower.

Hegemony does not equate to endless entanglements. On the contrary, the United States must thoroughly think through its commitments, and when there is a requirement for the military element of national power, military planners must plan with the idea of end state in mind. Possibly, this has never been more applicable as President Bush has called on the world to join in

²⁰¹ Walter N. Anderson, "Peace with Honor: Enduring Truths, Lessons Learned and Implications for a Durable Peace," (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 1999.), 6.

²⁰² Robert D. Kaplan, 102.

the campaign against terrorism, a campaign involving a diverse threat and no clear vision of when the war will end.²⁰³

Some of the recommendations in this paper may be upsetting, but an assessment of peace operations and its role in U.S. national strategy is necessary. The U.S. military must maintain its effectiveness in order to provide security to the United States. When asked if he thought the United States had learned any lessons from the Balkans it could apply to recent operations in Afghanistan, Carl Bildt, former UN special envoy to the Balkans, explained that countries ought to first sort out what political goals they want to achieve and make use of military force as a supplement to the political dialogue.²⁰⁴ A telling statement from an experienced policymaker. The military alone cannot achieve an end state in peace operations. Success requires a campaign plan that integrates all instruments of national power. Only then will the term end state be a relevant construct.

²⁰³ Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "Nasty, Brutish, and Long: America's War on Terrorism," *Current History*, December 2001, 403.

²⁰⁴ Anne Applebaum, "Guaging Success," *Slate Magazine*, October 8, 2001, [database online] (October 8, 2001, accessed January 6, 2002); available from <http://slate.msn.com/?=116930>.

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